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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE PATH FROM REGULATOR TO HUNTER: THE EXERCISE OF
PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION IN THE INVESTIGATION OF
PHYSICIANS AT TEACHING HOSPITALS

PAMELA H. BUCY*
This article examines the economic and cultural disruption that a law
enforcement initiative can have on an industry by focusing on a recent federal
law enforcement health care fraud initiative, Physicians at Teaching Hospitals
(“PATH”). The PATH initiative is an apt case study: it is nation-wide, was
undertaken after a deliberative process among multiple federal agencies, and is
focused on a limited group of health care providers regarding few legal and
reimbursement issues. Part I of this article describes the PATH initiative. Part
II briefly examines the arsenal of sanctions available to the government to
pursue health care fraud, focusing on the False Claims Act (“FCA”), the statute
utilized in the PATH initiative. Part III suggests that because the investigation
and prosecution of an industry can be disruptive to an industry and those it
services, care must be taken to ensure that the prosecutive initiative is
warranted.

* Copyright © 2000. Pamela H. Bucy. All rights reserved. Bainbridge Professor of Law, The
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JOURNAL for sponsoring this symposium, Dean Ken Randall of The University of Alabama
School of Law, the Law School Foundation and the William H. Sadler Fund for their support, and
to the following individuals and organizations who graciously provided sources for and feedback
about this article: Susan Adams, Office of Administrative Legal Services, University of
Wisconsin-Madison; Ivy Baer, Director and Regulatory Counsel, Division of Health Care Affairs,
Association of American Medical Colleges; William S. Brewbaker, III, Professor of Law,
University of Alabama; Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs, U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services; Harry Silver of Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Silver
(counsel for the Association of American Medical Colleges). The author is especially grateful to
Creighton Miller, The University of Alabama Bounds Law Library staff, Stephanie Smith
Woodard (University of Alabama Law ‘00), Steven R. Colclough (University of Alabama Law
‘00) and Michelle M. Kizziah (University of Alabama Law ‘01) for their research assistance. Part
II of this article is based upon PAMELA H. BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD: CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (1996 & Supp. 1999).
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THE PATH INITIATIVE

Background

Because of the way in which Medicare reimburses academic medical
centers1 and the teaching hospitals that they include, there has been
“longstanding concern” that Medicare would pay twice for the same service:
once under Part A, Medicare (“Medicare Part A”) and again, under Part B,
Medicare (“Medicare Part B”).2 Medicare Part A reimburses health care
providers for inpatient hospital services, home health services, and certain
other institutionally based services3 for about thirty-seven million persons age
sixty-five or older and certain categories of disabled persons.4 Medicare Part
A pays teaching hospitals for part of the costs of training physicians
(“residents”) by paying the hospitals’ “direct graduate medical education
reimbursement” (“DGME”).5 In 1996, Medicare Part A paid approximately $8
billion to teaching hospitals for the training of residents.6
Medicare Part B reimburses health care providers for physician services,
outpatient services, and various other medical and health services.7 Thus,
Medicare Part B pays physicians, including teaching physicians, for services
provided directly to Medicare patients.8 Consequently, residents who may be
professionally capable of rendering medical services are not eligible for
reimbursement under Medicare Part B, because their salaries already have been
factored into the teaching hospitals’ Medicare Part A reimbursement.9
Arguably, if Medicare Part B were to pay residents for the physician services
they render to patients, Medicare is paying teaching hospitals twice for the

1. An “academic medical center” is defined as “university–based health centers that include
at a minimum a hospital and associated clinics, a medical school, or one of the other health
professions schools.” Robert M. Carey & Carolyn Long Engelhard, Academic Medicine Meets
Managed Care: A High-impact Collision, 71 ACAD. MED. 839, 840 (1996).
2. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. HEHS-98-174, MEDICARE: CONCERNS WITH
PHYSICIANS AT TEACHING HOSPITALS (PATH) AUDITS (1998) 5-6 [hereinafter GAO, CONCERNS
WITH PATH].
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1395d(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); PAMELA H. BUCY, HEALTH CARE
FRAUD: CRIMINAL, CIVIL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 1.02[2] (1996 & Supp. 1999)
[hereinafter BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD].
4. Memorandum from June Gibbs Brown, Inspector General, United States Department of
Health and Human Services, to Bruce C. Vladeck, Administrator, Health Care Financing
Administration (HCFA), March 1996, at 3 [hereinafter Brown Memorandum].
5. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 5. DGME is based upon historic costs
that include the portion of the salaries of teaching physicians related to teaching residents,
residents’ salaries, and other related costs.
6. Id.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1395k (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
8. Brown Memorandum, supra note 4, at 4.
9. Id.
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training of physicians.10 In addition, Medicare Part B reimbursement rates are
premised upon the assumption that patient services will be rendered by
physicians, not by physicians in training.11 In an effort to eliminate these
problems, the Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”), which
administers Medicare, has made clear that, with certain limited exceptions,
teaching physicians billing Medicare Part B must personally provide the billed
services or be physically present when the resident provides the services.12
Academic medical centers have claimed confusion because of ambiguous
guidance provided by HCFA and the multi-faceted relationship teaching
physicians have with residents.13 Sometimes a teaching physician will be
present when a resident is rendering services to a patient, while on other
occasions the teaching physician will meet with the resident, review a patient’s
chart with the resident and provide treatment instructions which the resident
carries out. Teaching physicians also provide direction to residents by
discussing a patient’s situation with a group of residents and other teaching
physicians (“Grand Rounds”).14 In these instances, the teaching physician may
have provided considerable service to the patient but has not personally seen
the patient. Given this multi-faceted consultation, teaching and treatment
relationship among teaching physicians, residents and patients, it is difficult for
generic regulations to provide clear billing guidance.
10. As the General Counsel of the Department of Health and Human Services explained in
1997:
[S]upervision of interns and residents by teaching physicians is reimbursed under
Medicare Part A through graduate medical education (GME) payments. By this
mechanism, teaching physicians are paid for taking responsibility for the hospital’s
oversight of its doctors in training. It would be absurd to assert that physicians could
receive the significant remuneration that characterizes Part B reimbursement for
supplying the same level of services that qualifies and was paid for as Part A services.
Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, No. SA-CV 97-862 (C.D. Cal. filed Oct. 27, 1997)
[hereinafter AAMC Complaint] (citing Letter from Harriet S. Rabb, General Counsel of the
Department of Health and Human Services, to Jordan J. Cohen, M.D., President of the
Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”), and P. John Seward, M.D., Executive
Vice President of AAMC, July 11, 1997 [hereinafter Rabb Letter] (visited Jan. 18, 2000)
<http://www.aamc.org/hlthcare/path/oig711.htm>). See also GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH,
supra note 2, at 5-6 (warning that Medicare will possibly have to “pay twice”); Brown
Memorandum, supra note 4, at 4.
11. Rabb Letter, supra note 10, at 1-2.
12. Id. (noting that the standard for Medicare Part B payments to teaching physicians has
been variously expressed as requiring “personal and identifiable direction,” “performing the
physician services,” “supervision,” or “being present and ready to perform”).
13. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 3.
14. See AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 17. For articles chronicling residents’ and
teaching physicians’ reaction to PATH’s impact on clinical education, see, e.g., Lloyd M.
Krieger, Medicare Antifraud Initiatives: Effects on Resident Education, 281 JAMA 1227 (1999);
Joseph D. Robinson & Scott Gottlieb, The New Face of Medical Education, 281 JAMA 1226
(1999); Ruth SoRelle, Tracking a Tangled PATH, 1998 CIRCULATION 2191 (1998).
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The Department of Health and Human Services’ (“HHS”) audit and
investigation of Medicare Part B payments to teaching physicians led the
Office of Inspector General (“OIG”) and HHS to commence a nationwide
initiative known as Physicians at Teaching Hospitals (“PATH”).15 This
initiative followed a 1995 settlement between the United States Department of
Justice (“DOJ”) and the University of Pennsylvania (“Penn”),16 wherein Penn
agreed to pay approximately $30 million to the DOJ, without admitting guilt.17
The DOJ’s investigation focused on billings by teaching physicians on the
Penn medical school faculty for services rendered to patients at Penn’s hospital
and on possible inflation of services rendered (“upcoding”).18 HCFA took the
position that teaching physicians could properly bill Medicare for services
rendered to hospitalized patients only if the physician personally rendered the
services or if the teaching physician was physically present when the services
were rendered by the resident.19 Furthermore, if documentation in the patient
file did not reveal that the teaching physician was physically present when the
resident rendered the service, the OIG presumed that the physician was not
present and that any resulting claim for reimbursement was improper.20
There are 1,200 teaching hospitals in the United States.21 The OIG began
its PATH initiative by selecting the 125 teaching hospitals associated with each
of the nation’s 125 medical schools.22 In 1996, the OIG sent a letter to each of
these 125 academic medical centers, informing them that they were subject to
an audit of teaching physician Medicare Part B billings.23 Once a teaching
hospital received word that it was subject to a PATH audit, it was given two
choices. The teaching hospital could consent to PATH I, whereby an OIG
team would conduct, with the assistance of medical reviewers for the carrier,24
15. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 1.
16. The target of the investigation was the Clinical Practices of the University of
Pennsylvania (“CPUP”), which is a component of the University of Pennsylvania Health System
(“UPHS”). Brown Memorandum, supra note 4, at 1.
17. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 1.
18. The billings at issue were submitted from January 1, 1989 through December 31, 1994.
Id. Although other issues also were involved, including the possibility of “upcoding,” id. at 2122, the dominant issue was Part B billings by teaching physicians for services possibly rendered
by residents.
19. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 7-8 (stating that “[m]edical records must
contain documentation to support all services rendered.”).
20. Brown Memorandum, supra note 4, at 5; GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at
10.
21. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 12.
22. Id. See also Cheryl Baacke & Lisa M. Rockelli, IG to Audit All Hospital Academic
Institutions Under PATH, Official Says, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1118 (July 25, 1996).
23. Id.
24. Carriers are private groups or associations hired by HCFA to administer Part B,
Medicare. 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1994 & Supp. III 1997). Intermediaries are private groups or
associations hired by the Secretary of HHS through the Health Care Financing Agency (HCFA)
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an audit of the medical faculty’s Medicare Part B physician billings for one
year between 1990-1996.25 Alternatively, the teaching hospital could consent
to PATH II, whereby the teaching hospital could conduct the audit itself, at its
own expense and under the OIG team supervision, using OIG approved
auditors or consultants.26 Most teaching hospitals apparently have opted for
PATH II based upon the belief that recoupment and penalties would be less
severe under PATH II than under PATH I.27
Within one year of announcing the PATH initiative, audits were underway
at forty-nine institutions.28 As of November, 1999, eight PATH audits have
been resolved.29 Four of the eight institutions have agreed to settlements with
OIG, for a total of $64.3 million.30 Audits at the remaining four institutions
concluded with no money being owed to the government. Additional PATH
audits are planned or underway at thirty-seven other institutions.31
B.

Rules and Regulations Regarding Medicare Part B Reimbursement to
Teaching Physicians

Targeted teaching hospitals have objected strenuously to the PATH
initiative, arguing that the rules, regulations, and other guidance concerning
Medicare Part B billings by teaching physicians are vague and that HHS,
through the PATH initiative, is retroactively applying “unpublished rules,
contrary to existing published rules” as a way to coerce settlements.32 In 1997,
a number of teaching hospitals filed suit seeking injunctive relief.33 In this
to administer Medicare Part A. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u (1994 & Supp. III 1997). See infra notes 3941 and accompanying text.
25. See AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 54.
26. Id.
27. According to the AAMC Complaint: “[t]he OIG/DOJ team . . . either expressly threatens
or implies that the outcome for the targeted faculty is likely to be less favorable and the penalty to
be assessed great under PATH I than under PATH II.” See id. ¶ 57; see also GAO, CONCERNS
WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 12 n.23 (stating that “[i]n return for volunteering for a PATH II
audit, the OIG advises DOJ of the institution’s level of cooperation . . . [which] the DOJ may
take . . . into account when resolving losses . . . from any . . . [false claims].”).
28. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 12. The OIG later dropped sixteen of its
original forty-nine PATH audits. See GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, app. II, at 35.
29. The institutions included Thomas Jefferson University, Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical
Center, Yale University, the University of Virginia, and the University of Pittsburgh. Id. at 2,
Table 1.
30. These institutions included: Thomas Jefferson University, which settled in August, 1996,
for $12 million; University of Virginia, which settled in November, 1997, for $8.6 million; and
the University of Pittsburgh which settled in March, 1998, for $17 million. Id.
31. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 2. See also Sean Martin, Teaching
Physician Billing Probe Blessed by GAO, AM. MED. NEWS, Sept. 7, 1998, at 5.
32. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 2.
33. See generally AAMC Complaint, supra note 10. This complaint was dismissed on April
28, 1998, for lack of jurisdiction. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colleges v. United States, 34 F. Supp.2d
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suit, the hospitals argued that HHS deprived the hospitals of due process and
violated the agency’s own rule making procedures, the Administrative
Procedure Act, and the Medicare Act.34 In response, HHS maintained that the
“physically present when services are rendered” requirement is longstanding,
and has been clearly communicated to teaching hospitals.35
On at least eleven occasions between 1966 and 1995, HHS issued guidance
for payment of Medicare Part B services rendered by teaching physicians.36
HHS promulgated the first regulation in 1966 stating that a teaching
physician’s service was reimbursable as long it was “an identifiable service
requiring performance by a physician in person.”37 In 1967, HHS issued
regulations specifying that Medicare Part B reimbursement was permissible
where the “physician provides personal and identifiable direction to interns or
residents who are participating in the care of his patient.”38
HHS contracts with private entities (usually insurance companies) to assist
in the administration of the Medicare program.39 These entities are designated
“intermediaries” for Medicare Part A and “carriers” for Medicare Part B.40
Intermediaries and carriers assume the responsibility to receive, screen and pay
claims submitted by Medicare providers for eligible services rendered to
Medicare patients.41 In 1969, HCFA issued Intermediary Letter 372 (“IL
372”) for guidance to carriers and intermediaries, noting that “there appears to
be a serious need to obtain a better and more uniform understanding among
carriers, providers, and physicians of the conditions under which payment may
be made under Part B for services rendered to patients by supervising
physicians in the teaching setting.”42 IL 372 stated that in order to bill for
1187 (C.D. Ca. 1998). AAMC appealed this dismissal on June 23, 1998. The appeal is currently
pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The Greater New York
Hospital Association, joined by several New York teaching hospitals and medical schools, filed a
similar lawsuit in the Southern District of New York. See Text of Greater New York Hosp. Ass’n.
Lawsuit Against HHS (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://healthcarenewsserver.com/stories/HCN1998
042400003a.shtml> (text of the plaintiffs’ complaint). This suit was also dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. See Greater N.Y. Hosp. Ass’n v. United States, No. 98 Civ. 2741 (RLC), 1999 WL
1021561 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 9, 1999).
34. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶¶ 72-82.
35. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 3.
36. These eleven occasions are time lined in Key Events Related to the PATH Initiative. See
id. app. II., at 34-35.
37. 20 C.F.R. § 405.483(a) (1966).
38. 20 C.F.R. § 405.521 (1967) (recodified as 42 C.F.R. § 521).
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395h (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (involving “fiscal intermediaries”); 42
U.S.C. § 1395u (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (involving “carriers”).
40. Id.
41. See id. §§ 1395h(a), 1395u(a) (1994).
42. U. S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Intermediary Letter No. 372 (Apr. 1969)
[hereinafter “IL 372”], reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 3459.33, at 1289-11 to
-14 (July 17, 1997).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2000]

THE PATH FROM REGULATOR TO HUNTER

9

services under Medicare Part B, a teaching physician must “render sufficient
personal and identifiable medical services to the Medicare beneficiary to
exercise full, personal control over the management of the portion of the case
for which a charge can be recognized.”43 “Full, personal control” required that
the physician review the patient’s medical history and treatment, personally
examine the patient, determine the diagnosis and course of treatment, perform
physician services “or supervise the treatment to assure that appropriate
services are provided by interns, residents or others . . . .”44 IL 372 also
indicated that a teaching physician’s services to Medicare patients should be
“of the same character, in terms of the responsibilities to the patient that are
assumed and fulfilled, as the services he renders to his other paying patients”
to qualify for Medicare Part B reimbursement. 45
In 1970, HHS issued additional instructions to carriers through
Intermediary Letter 70-2 (“IL 70-2”).46 IL 70-2 informed carriers that they
may presume that a physician rendering inpatient services personally examined
a patient if the physician’s signature appeared in the patient file:
If the physician countersigned the entries in the record pertaining to the
patient’s history and the record of examinations and tests, it would be
presumed the physician personally examined the patient and determined the
course of treatment to be followed. Frequent reviews of the patient’s progress
by the physician would be established by the appearance in the record of the
physician’s signed notes and/or countersignature to notes with sufficient
regularity that it could be reasonably concluded that he was personally
responsible for the patient’s care.47

In 1980, Congress enacted a statute which closely tracked IL 372’s
language, specifying that a carrier should not pay for teaching physicians’
services unless the physicians “render[] sufficient personal and identifiable
physicians’ services to the patient to exercise full, personal control over the
management of the portion of the case for which the payment is sought.”48
The legislative history accompanying this statute indicated that the House
Budget Committee “strongly believes teaching physicians should personally
perform or personally supervise patient services in order to qualify for fee-for-

43. See IL 372, Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 3459.33, at 1289-11.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. U. S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services, Intermediary Letter No. 70-2, (Jan. 1970)
[hereinafter IL 70-2], reprinted in Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 26,076, at 9188 (1970).
47. Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) ¶ 26,076, at 9193. See also AAMC Complaint,
supra note 10, ¶ 28.
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1395u(b)(7)(A)(i)(I) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). According to the AAMC
Complaint, supra note 10, Congress enacted this statute to “incorporate the medical direction
standard set forth in [42 C.F.R.] § 405.521 . . . .” AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 30.
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service payment.”49 In 1982, when enacting legislation requiring Medicare to
promulgate regulations regarding reimbursement of physician services under
Part B, the Senate Finance Committee stated that physician services to hospital
inpatients were reimbursable “only if such services are identifiable
professional services to patients that require performance by physicians in
person . . . .”50
In 1986, the General Accounting Office (“GAO”) reviewed the
requirements for Medicare Part B reimbursement by teaching physicians.51
The GAO concluded that Medicare Part B reimbursement “required
documentation in a patient’s medical records that the teaching physician either
personally provided the service or was present when the service was provided
by a resident.”52 The GAO also found that HCFA previously had failed to
adequately communicate these documentation requirements to providers.53 At
that time, the GAO recommended that HCFA “establish and enforce explicit
documentation requirements” to clarify the matter for teaching physicians and
hospitals.54 On December 30, 1992, all regional Medicare administrators were
informed that physicians’ fees “are payable in teaching hospitals if . . . the
physician personally performs an identifiable service . . . [or] the physician is
physically present when the resident performs an identifiable supervised for
which payment is sought.”55 The crucial question is to what extent Medicare
administrators communicated this clarification to teaching physicians at
academic medical centers.
On December 8, 1995—nine years later—national rules were finalized.56
These rules limited Medicare Part B reimbursement to teaching physicians
who “medically directed resident services for which the teaching physician
was physically present with the resident during key portions of the billed
service.”57 Further, the rules stated that the patient file must reflect the

49. H. R. REP. NO. 96-1167, at 70 (1980).
50. S. REP. NO. 97-494, VOL. 1, at 22 (1982).
51. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REP. NO. HRD-86-36, DOCUMENTING TEACHING
PHYSICIAN SERVICES STILL A PROBLEM (1986) 20 [hereinafter GAO, DOCUMENTING SERVICES].
52. Id.
53. Id. at 21-22, 32 (observing that HCFA’s instructions were not “explicit” or “clear
enough”).
54. Id. at 32.
55. Letter from Charles R. Booth, Director Office of Payment Policy, United States
Department of Health and Human Services, to All Associate Regional Administrators for
Medicare, December 30, 1992 [hereinafter Booth Letter].
56. See GAO CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 10 (acknowledging a ten year gap
between its 1986 report and HCFA’s resulting rules). These regulations are currently at 42
C.F.R. § 415.172 (1998).
57. See 42 C.F.R. § 415.172(b) (1998).
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teaching physician’s physical presence at the time the service was furnished.58
To provide teaching physicians and hospitals with timely notice and an
opportunity to bring practices into compliance, the 1995 regulations were not
made effective until July 1, 1996.59 Prior to July 1, 1996, HCFA issued a
number of communications, generally to carriers, but also published in the
Federal Register and Code of Federal Regulations60 which, according to a 1998
GAO Report, “appear to have contributed to confusion over Medicare’s
enforcement policy.”61 In particular, the 1991-1996 version of HCFA Form
1500, the claim form submitted by physicians to obtain reimbursement under
Part B, appeared to permit reimbursement to teaching physicians who
supervised residents without requiring that the teaching physicians be
physically present at the time the services were rendered.62 Form 1500
provided:
I certify that the services shown on this form were medically indicated and
necessary for the health of the patient and were personally furnished by me or
were furnished incident to my professional service by my employee under my
immediate supervision, except as otherwise expressly permitted by Medicare
or [Civilian Health and Medical Program for the Uniformed Services]
CHAMPUS regulations.63

As can be seen from the above review, over a thirty year time period some
official pronouncements have required teaching physicians to be physically
present when a resident rendered service (1966 regulations, 1982 legislative
history, 1996 regulations)64 while other pronouncements have required only
that a teaching physician “provide direction” or “supervise” the resident who
rendered the service (1967 regulations, 1969 “IL 372” to carriers and

58. Id. The AAMC believed that this new physical presence requirement went beyond the
countersignature requirements of IL 372 and IL 70. See AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 36.
59. See 60 Fed. Reg. 63,124, 63,142-43.
60. This information included the Booth Letter, supra note 55, and a 1995 letter from the
Director of HCFA’s Bureau of Policy Development. See GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra
note 2, at 10. Additionally, HCFA acknowledged “wide variations and lack of consistency” in
regulations and program standards, see AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 32 (citing 54 Fed.
Reg. 5948 (1989)), while later indicating that the original 1967 regulations and IL 372 could
provide guidance for those seeking “a more detailed explanation of attending physician criteria.”
Id. ¶ 33 (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 59,507 (1991) (republishing 42 C.F.R. § 405.521 which set forth the
“original requirements in a revised format”)).
61. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 10.
62. See AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 48.
63. Id. HHS argues that because residents are not “employees” of the teaching physician,
Form 1500 in no way permits reimbursement to teaching physicians who are not present when
services are rendered to patients. Draft Comments by and Electronic Mail Communications with
Lewis Morris, Assistant Inspector General for Legal Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Services (various dates in Fall, 1999).
64. See supra notes 37, 50, 57-59 and accompanying text.
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intermediaries, 1970 “IL 70-2” to carriers and intermediaries, 1980 legislation,
1991 HCFA claim form).65 It is little wonder that the GAO concluded, in 1986
and again in 1998, that the physical presence requirement for teaching
physicians has not been “clearly communicated or consistently enforced.”66
Interestingly, in a 1997 letter to the President and Executive Vice President of
the Association of American Medical Colleges (“AAMC”), the General
Counsel of HHS acknowledged that “the standards for paying teaching
physicians under Part B of Medicare have not been consistently and clearly
articulated by HCFA over a period of decades.”67
C. The PATH Audit Protocol
When the OIG announced the PATH audit protocol for reviewing
Medicare Part B billings by teaching physicians, they selected all teaching
physicians at the 125 hospitals associated with U.S. medical schools for
potential audits.68 The OIG selected these facilities because “of the nation’s
1,200 teaching hospitals, these institutions had the greatest number of residents
and received the most Medicare revenue.”69 As of November, 1999, PATH
audits were planned, completed or underway for thirty of these institutions.70
The audit protocol, whether under PATH I or II,71 requires review of one
hundred randomly selected inpatient admissions during a selected one-year
period between 1994-1995.72 Projections are made from these findings to all
physician billings submitted by the physicians during the established period
within the six-year statute of limitations time period set forth in the False
Claims Act.73 Teaching hospitals argue that this protocol permits claims by a
65. See supra notes 38-48, 60-63 and accompanying text.
66. Id. at 11. See also GAO, DOCUMENTING SERVICES, supra note 51, at 32 (noting that
“HCFA’s current [as of 1986] requirements . . . are not explicit enough” and that “enforce[ment]
var[ies] substantially among carriers”).
67. Rabb Letter, supra note 10, at 4. The General Counsel also found that some carriers had
communicated billing requirements clearly and thus communicated that OIG would undertake
PATH audits only where carriers issued clear explanations of the reimbursement rules. Id. at 5.
68. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
69. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 12.
70. Id.
71. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
72. See Brief for Appellant, Ass’n of Amer. Med. Colleges v. United States, No. 98-56190
(9th Cir. filed Nov. 9, 1998) (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.aamc.org/hlthcare/path/amc
brief.txt>.
Typically, 100 inpatient admissions yields between 1500 and 2500 occasions of physician
service which have been provided by a small percentage of the faculty members. By way
of comparison, . . . University of Michigan faculty files an average of 350,000 claims
annually. Thus, the total audit sample is less than ½ of one percent of the total claims
filed for a single year.
Id. at 17 n.7.
73. 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (1994); see infra Part II.C.
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few physicians to be the only claims reviewed and their billing errors, if any, to
be projected to other physicians not included in the audit sample. Teaching
hospitals further complain that the OIG auditing protocol does not permit the
physicians whose claims are identified as problematic, or the teaching hospital
which employs these physicians, to rebut the conclusion of wrongdoing.74
OIG, on the other hand, maintains that “physicians are part of the audit process
and have ample opportunities to bring up issue and provide additional
evidence.”75
At the outset of each PATH audit, the auditors tell teaching hospitals that
the alternative to PATH I or PATH II audit participation is litigation under the
FCA.76 Penalties could be substantial, since the FCA mandates treble damages
and mandatory penalties of $5,000 - $10,000 per claim.77 As the AAMC
notes: “The potential liability . . . is hundreds of millions of dollars for any
faculty that averages 100,000 Medicare claims annually and experiences an
error rate of even two percent . . . .”78 The AAMC and the various teaching
hospitals which filed suit for injunctive relief against the enforcement of PATH
have argued that, given the possibility of severe penalties under the FCA,
teaching hospitals have no choice but to settle.79 Despite the teaching
hospitals’ arguments regarding the audit protocol, the GAO concluded that the
OIG “followed a reasonable methodology” in conducting the audits, with one
significant exception.80 Rather than undertaking audits of all one hundred and
twenty-five teaching hospitals affiliated with the nation’s medical schools, the
GAO concluded that OIG should have “identified institutions with suspected
billing problems and then targeted its efforts accordingly.”81

74. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 62.
75. Draft Comments by and Electronic Mail Communications with Lewis Morris, Assistant
Inspector General for Legal Affairs, U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Services (various dates in
Fall, 1999).
76. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 57.
77. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) requires proof of “knowing” submission of false claims,
which includes reckless disregard of the truth and deliberate indifference to the truth. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729(b) (1994).
78. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 57.
79. As the AAMC asserts:
The fiduciary responsibility the Trustees and managers of the [teaching] universities,
hospitals and faculties have to their communities, their institutions, and the patients served
by their teaching and patient care programs, make them particularly susceptible to
coercion when financial risk of such magnitude is threatened, whether directly or
impliedly.
Id.
80. See GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 23.
81. Id. The GAO explained that “[b]ecause PATH audits can be time-consuming and
expensive for both the government and the institutions, we believe that the OIG should have had
a sound basis for asking the institutions to incur these costs.” See also GAO Confirms Legal
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As already noted, teaching hospitals have felt compelled to settle a PATH
audit rather than contest its findings or protocol due to their belief that failure
to settle will lead to suit under the False Claims Act (“FCA”).82 With its
statutorily mandated damages and penalties, the FCA is an intimidating cause
of action. Yet, it is only one of numerous statutes available to the government
for pursuing health care fraud. As Part II of this article discusses, liability
under the FCA may be mild compared to other sanctions available to pursue
fraudulent health care providers. It is the full arsenal, the FCA coupled with
criminal and administrative sanctions and massive resources, that is truly
intimidating.
II. RESOURCES AND SANCTIONS AIMED AT HEALTH CARE FRAUD
A.

The Resources

Government resources available to combat health care fraud are
formidable: far-reaching criminal statutes; civil causes of action which carry
hefty, mandatory damages and penalties; forfeiture of assets; and
administrative penalties of suspension and exclusion, which may be the “death
penalty” for health care providers. Almost annually for the past decade,
Congress has passed stricter laws aimed at health care fraud.83 Most recently,
with the passage of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”)84 in 1996 and the passage of the Balanced Budget Act85 in 1997,
Congress substantially broadened the federal government’s statutory authority
to prosecute health care fraud. The new laws added five new health care
crimes, most of which carry stiff penalties and mandatory forfeiture of assets;86
expand the reach of federal crimes targeted at health care fraud to include fraud
upon private health care insurers;87 and broaden HHS’s authority to impose

Basis for PATH, But Raises Questions About IG’s Audits, 7 Health L. Rep. (BNA) 1292 (Aug. 13
1998).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79.
83. For example, note Congress’ attention to the anti-kickback statute. First passed in 1971
as a misdemeanor offense, see Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242(b), 86 Stat. 1329 (1972), Congress
amended the statute in 1977, see Pub. L. No. 95-142, 91 Stat. 1175 (1977), strengthening its
provisions and making violation of it a felony.
84. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) [hereinafter HIPAA].
85. Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Title IV-Medicare, Medicaid and Children’s Health
Provisions, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251 (1997).
86. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 669 (Supp. III 1997) (theft involving health care programs); 18
U.S.C. § 1035 (Supp. III 1997) (false statements involving health care programs); 18 U.S.C. §
1518 (Supp. III 1997) (obstructing a health care criminal investigation); and 18 U.S.C. § 1347
(Supp. III 1997) (health care fraud).
87. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 669, 1035, 1347.
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civil monetary damages88 and exclusion.89 Perhaps most significantly, HIPAA
appropriated substantial monies for investigations of health care fraud and
established a self-funding trust to finance future health care fraud
investigations.90 Under HIPAA, criminal fines and forfeitures in cases
involving a “federal health care offense,” civil monetary penalties imposed in
health care cases, and penalties and damages recovered under the FCA in
health care cases are to be deposited into the trust fund.91 In 1998, the trust
fund’s second year of operation, federal and state governments collected $296
million from anti-fraud actions in health care cases.92 Of this amount, $119.6

88. Pub. L. No. 105-33, § 4304, 111 Stat. at 383-84 (1997) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7a(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
89. HIPAA § 211, 110 Stat. at 2003-04 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a)-(b)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
90. HIPAA § 201(b), 110 Stat. at 1993 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395i (1994 &
Supp. III 1997)) (establishing a “Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Account” expenditure in
the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund).
91. HIPAA § 201(b)(2)(C), 110 Stat. at 1993-94.
92.
Total Transfer/Deposits by Recipient 1998
Department of the Treasury
HIPAA Deposits to the Medicare Trust Fund
Gifts and Bequests

$3,000.00

Amount Equal to Criminal Fines

$2,503,298.00

Civil Monetary Penalties

$1,855,277.00

Amount Equal to Asset Forfeiture *
Amount Equal to Penalties and Multiple Damages

$0.00
$103,025,990.00

Health Care Financing Administration

$27,998,956.00

OIG Audit Disallowances - Recovered

$144,741,634.00

Restitution/Compensatory Damages

$280,128,155.00

Restitution/Compensatory Damages to Other Federal Agencies
Department of Defense

$7,488,888.00
$173,866.00

Office of Personnel Management

$3,125,418.00

Other

$1,270,196.00

Department of Health and Human Services - Other than HCFA
Relators’ Payments **
TOTAL *

$12,058,368.00
4,344,610.00
$296,531,133.00

* This includes only forfeitures under 18 U.S.C. § 1347, a new federal health care fraud
offense that became effective on August 21, 1996. Not included are forfeitures obtained in
numerous health care fraud cases prosecuted under federal mail and wire fraud and other
offenses.
** These are funds awarded to private persons who file suits on behalf of the Federal
Government under the qui tam provisions of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b) (1994).
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million was appropriated from the fund for health care fraud investigations
conducted by HHS/OIG.93
The full impact of these increased resources is just beginning to be felt.
The Inspector General’s Office of HHS currently employs a medical fraud staff
of 1,143, up one-third from 1996.94 Department of Justice attorneys and FBI
Agents devoted to health care fraud matters have increased by 175% since
1993.95 Since 1993, fighting health care fraud has been a top priority of the
U.S. Department of Justice.96 Law enforcement’s focus on health care fraud
has borne fruit. In the two years between 1995 and 1997, for example,
criminal health care investigations increased 21.6%,97 criminal health care
fraud prosecutions filed increased 23%,98 criminal health care fraud
convictions increased 37%,99 and pending civil matters brought under the False
Claims Act increased 185%.100 Since 1986, the DOJ has recovered $1.8 billion
from matters involving health care fraud,101 with $1.2 billion collected in fiscal
year 1997 alone.102
B.

Statutes Directed at Criminal Acts of Health Care Fraud

Over thirty federal statutes are directed at criminal health care fraud or are
applicable and routinely used to prosecute health care fraud.103 The penalties
imposed by most of these statutes include possible maximum terms of prison
of five years, and maximum fines of $250,000,104 although a few statutes carry

*** Funds are also collected on behalf of state Medicaid programs and private insurance
companies; these funds are not represented here.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS. & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD AND
ABUSE PROGRAM, ANNUAL REPORT FOR FY 1998 5-6 (1999) [hereinafter HHS & DOJ FRAUD
REPORT FY 1998] (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/98hipaa_ar.htm>. Cited page
numbers correspond to pagination of this internet source.
93. Id. at 7.
94. Health Care Waste, Fraud and Abuse: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the
House Comm. on Ways and Means, 105th Cong. at 58 (1997).
95. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, HEALTH CARE FRAUD REPORT 1997 13 (1998) [hereinafter
DOJ FRAUD REPORT FY 1997] (visited Jan. 18, 2000) <http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/health97.
html> (from 200 in 1993 to 551 in 1997). Cited page numbers correspond to pagination of this
internet source.
96. Id. at 2.
97. Id. at 10 (from 1,247 in 1995 to 1,517 in 1997).
98. Id. (from 229 in 1995 to 282 in 1997).
99. Id. (from 158 in 1995 to 217 in 1997).
100. DOJ FRAUD REPORT FY 1997, supra note 95, at 10 (from 1,406 in 1995 to 4,010 in
1997).
101. Id. at 6.
102. Id. at 7.
103. BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, § 3.01.
104. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 286, 287, 371, 1341, 1343, 1505, 1622 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 641,
1001, 1503, 1512 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 1518 (Supp. III 1997).
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maximum prison terms of twenty years,105 even life imprisonment.106
Although mandatory forfeiture of property which “constitutes or is derived
from” fraud has been required in limited instances for years,107 mandatory
forfeiture authority in instances of health care fraud was expanded in 1996
with passage of HIPAA.108 HIPAA also added five additional crimes directed
at health care fraud.109
In addition to federal statutes and resources, the states aggressively
prosecute health care fraud, usually extending their investigations to include
instances of patient physical abuse. In 1977, Congress passed legislation
establishing Medicaid Fraud Control Units (“MFCUs”).110 In 1983, Congress
made MFCUs mandatory.111 Most MFCUs are part of a state’s Attorney
General’s office or other law enforcement office and are staffed with attorneys,
investigators and auditors trained in health care and complex cases.112
Currently, MFCUs have a combined staff of over 1,275 and a joint
federal/state budget of $95 million.113
As noted throughout this section, proof of intent to commit fraud, stated in
a variety of ways, is an element of every criminal offense. Ambiguous billing
regulations not only make it difficult to determine whether improper bills were
submitted, but also make it difficult to prove the requisite intent to defraud.

105. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1961 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (Supp. III
1997).
106. 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (Supp. III 1997) (“if the violation results in death”).
107. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §1957 (1994); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1961 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
108. See HIPAA § 249(a), 110 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (1994
& Supp. III 1997)).
109. See supra note 86.
110. Medicare-Medicaid Anti-Fraud and Abuse Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-142, § 1, 91
Stat. 1201 (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(g) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
111. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13625, 107 Stat. 636
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(g) (1994 & Supp. III 1997)). A state may obtain a
waiver of this requirement by demonstrating that it has a minimal amount of Medicaid fraud and
that residents of facilities funded, in part, through Medicaid are protected against abuse and/or
neglect. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396a (61).
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1396b(q)(6) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
113. The New York MFCU, with 280 employees, is the largest MFCU; Wyoming, with four
employees, is the smallest MFCU. Hearing on Health Care Fraud Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight and Investigations of the House Commerce Comm., 106th Cong. (Nov. 9, 1999)
(testimony of John Krayniak, Director, New Jersey Medicaid Fraud Control Unit).
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Although 18 U.S.C. § 287115 applies to any false claim made against the
federal government, it is a common statute employed to prosecute health care
fraud. This statute was first passed in 1863;116 soon thereafter, it was separated
into three statutes: the current § 287, a prior version of 18 U.S.C. § 1001117 and
a prior version of the civil False Claims Act.118 The elements of § 287 are: (1)
making or presenting a claim, (2) which is false, fictitious or fraudulent, (3)
and material, (4) to a department or agency of the United States, (5) and, at the
time the claim is made, the person presenting it knows it is false, fictitious or
fraudulent.119 Medicare claims need not violate federal law to constitute a
violation of § 287; it is sufficient if the claims violate guidelines set forth in the
billing manual supplied by private insurance companies which contract with
the federal government to process Medicare and Medicaid claims.120 Both §
287 and the civil False Claims Act121 apply to almost every situation involving
alleged false claims submitted to the federal government. Because § 287 and
the civil False Claims Act originated in the same legislation, they share many
of the same elements and courts liberally apply precedent regarding one statute
to the other.122 If physicians at teaching hospitals know that they are not to bill
for patient services rendered by residents when the physician is not physically
present, § 287 would be violated.

114. Portions of Part II.B.1-2 are based upon BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3.
115. 18 U.S.C. § 287 (1994) provides:
Whoever makes or presents to any person or officer in the civil, military or naval service
of the United States, or to any department or agency thereof, any claim upon or against
the United States, or any department or agency thereof, knowing such claim to be false,
fictitious or fraudulent, shall be imprisoned not more than five years or shall be subject to
a fine or both.
116. See Act of March 2, 1863, at ch. 67, 12 Stat. 696-99 (1863).
117. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.b.
118. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
119. See United States v. Medical Servs. Corp., 43 F. Supp.2d 499, 500 (D. Del. 1999).
120. Id. at 502.
121. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994). See infra Part II.C. For more information on the False
Claims Act see JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS (1993 & Supp.
1999) [hereinafter BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS]; BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3;
SARAH N. WELLING, SARA SUN BEALE & PAMELA H. BUCY, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND
RELATED ACTIONS, ch. 27 (1998) [hereinafter WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, RELATED ACTIONS].
122. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 540 n.2 (1943); United
States v. Winchester, 407 F. Supp. 261 (D. Del. 1975).
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False Statements: 18 U.S.C. § 1001

Although 18 U.S.C. § 1001 is a generic statute, prohibiting any type of
false statement or concealment within the jurisdiction of the federal
government, prosecutors have used § 1001 for many years to prosecute health
care fraud.123 The elements of § 1001 are: (1) knowingly and willfully, (2)
making a false, material statement or concealing a material fact or using a
writing or document that is false in a material matter, (3) in any matter within
the jurisdiction of any branch of the United States government.124
Courts tend to interpret § 1001 broadly. As the Fifth Circuit explained:
“The false statement statute is necessarily couched in very broad terms to
encompass the variety of deceptive practices which ingenious individuals
might perpetrate upon an increasingly complex government.”125 For example,
§ 1001 would be violated if a teaching physician at a teaching hospital who,
knowing that he could not bill Medicare for patient services rendered by
residents unless the teaching physician was present, submitted records falsely
indicating that he was present when the resident rendered the services.
c.

Mail Fraud and Wire Fraud: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343

Mail fraud,126 along with its “cousin,” wire fraud,127 is the most common
statute used in the federal system to prosecute fraud, including health care

123. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) provides, in pertinent part:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, whoever, in any matter within the
jurisdiction of the executive, legislative, or judicial branch of the Government of the
United States, knowingly and willfully —
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact;
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation; or
(3) makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry;
shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
124. United States v. Capo, 791 F.2d 1054, 1068-69 (2d Cir. 1986), reh’g granted, 817 F.2d
947 (1987).
125. United States v. Massey, 550 F.2d 300, 305 (5th Cir. 1977).
126. The mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), provides:
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises. . .for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice or attempting to do so,
places in any post office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes to be
deposited any matter or thing whatever to be sent or delivered by any private or
commercial interstate carrier, or takes or receives, therefrom, any such matter or thing, or
knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or by such carrier according to the direction
thereon. . .any such matter or thing, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
127. The wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (1994), provides in pertinent part:
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fraud.128 The elements of mail fraud are: (1) devising a scheme or artifice to
defraud or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, and (2) use of the mails in furtherance of the scheme. There is no
requirement of interstate use of the mails.129 The elements of wire fraud are:
(1) devising a scheme or artifice to defraud or for obtaining money or property
by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, and (2) interstate use of wire, radio
or television communication.130 Courts interpret these statutes broadly. As
one court explained: “Because of the statutes’ broad, amorphous language,
coupled with a lack of explanatory legislative history, courts have generally
enjoyed considerable latitude in determining what types of schemes come
within the purview of the statutes.”131
If it can be proven that a teaching physician at an academic medical center
knew that she could not bill Medicare for services provided to patients by
residents when the teaching physician was not present, but submitted such bills
anyway, mail fraud has been committed if the physician caused any item,
which furthers this billing, to be sent through the U.S. mails, or by an interstate
carrier such as Federal Express. Wire fraud has been committed in this
situation if the teaching physician used or caused to be used any interstate use
of wire facilities, including telephone calls or faxes.
The mail fraud and wire fraud statutes are powerful not only because of
their broad scope, but also because they serve as “predicate acts” for even
more powerful statutes, like RICO and money laundering.
d.

Medicare and Medicaid Fraud: 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1)

Making or causing false statements to be made to obtain payment from a
federal health care program may be prosecuted as a violation of 42 U.S.C. §
1320a-7b(a)(1).132 The elements of § 1320a-7b(a)(1) are: (1) knowingly and

Whoever, having devised or intend to devise any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for
obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises, transmits or causes to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, or television
communication interstate or foreign commerce, any writings, signs signals, pictures, or
sounds for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice, shall [guilty of an offense].
128. Enacted in 1872, the mail fraud statute is viewed as the “first line of defense” against
fraud of all kinds. See Jed. S. Rakoff, Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771,
772 (1979). Prosecutors use the statute to prosecute consumer fraud, insurance fraud, public
corruption, bank frauds, securities fraud and health care fraud.
129. 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
131. See Medical Servs. Corp., 43 F. Supp.2d at 501.
132. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) provides that:
Whoever knowingly and willfully makes or causes to be made any false statement or
presentation of a material fact in any application for any benefit or payment under a
federal health care program . . . shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction thereof
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or both.
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willfully, (2) making or causing to be made a false statement or representation
of material fact, (3) in a claim for payment under the federal health care
Although § 1320a-7b(a)(1) specifically applies to false
programs.133
statements made to obtain payments from federal health care programs,
prosecutors pursuing health care fraud are not limited to § 1320a-7b(a)(1) in
such instances and still may proceed under generic fraud and false statement
statutes. Health care fraud in violation of § 287134 or § 1001135 would almost
certainly be prosecutable under § 1320a-7b(a)(1).
e.

Money Laundering: 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956 and 1957

Although most people think of money launderers as drug dealers,
fraudulent health care providers, as well as any other white collar offender,
may be prosecuted for money laundering. There are two types of money
laundering offenses: reporting offenses and “transportation” offenses.
Reporting offenses penalize the failure to report cash transactions.136
Transportation offenses forbid moving illegally obtained money into, out of, or
among bank accounts, or moving legally obtained money among bank
accounts to avoid tax or reporting obligations.137
The reporting statutes include both civil and criminal penalties, while the
transportation statutes only impose criminal liability. Conviction under either
the reporting or transportation statutes carries mandatory forfeiture of assets
involved in the offense.138 Although money laundering statutes are lengthy
and complex, prosecutors can fairly easily prove money laundering in any
instance of fraud where the defendant uses the proceeds of the fraud to
purchase goods or services or pay debts.139 For example, defendants in United
133. United States v. Laughlin, 26 F.3d 1523, 1526 (10th Cir. 1994).
134. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
136. 31 U.S.C. § 5313 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) requires a domestic financial institution
involved in a cash transaction of $10,000 or more to file a report on the transaction. 31 U.S.C. §
5324 (1994) prohibits structuring financial transactions (as in breaking the transactions into small
transactions) for the purpose or evading reporting requirements. Finally, 26 U.S.C. § 7203 (1994)
expands the groups of persons who must report cash transactions, requiring “all persons engaged
in a trade or business” to report cash transactions over $10,000. 31 U.S.C. § 5321 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997) imposes a civil penalty for violations of § 5313, while 31 U.S.C. § 5322 (1994) imposes
a criminal penalty of imprisonment for not more than five years, or a fine of not more than
$250,000, or both, for willful violations of § 5313.
137. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956, 1957 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
139. Excellent sources on money laundering include: United States Department of Justice,
United States Attorney’s Manual § 9-105A.000 (Money Laundering Prosecution Manual); Money
Laundering Law Report (Leader Publications); Symposium, The Anti-Money Laundering
Statutes: Where From Here, 44 ALA. L. REV. 657 (1993); Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money
Laundering and the Federal Criminal Law, 41 FLA. L. REV. 287 (1989); G. Richard Strafer,
Money Laundering: The Crime of the 90’s, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 149 (1989).
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States v. Suba140 submitted false cost reports to Medicare on behalf of a home
health care company, thereby obtaining reimbursement at a higher rate.141 The
defendants were convicted of money laundering, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956,
because they invested the excessive reimbursement in stock, land and
brokerage accounts and deposited the proceeds into company accounts from
which they paid themselves.142 Section 1957, which does not contain the
stiffer intent element of § 1956, is especially broad. As the Ninth Circuit
noted: “[Section 1957] is a powerful tool because it makes any dealing with a
bank potentially a trap for . . . any . . . defendant who has a hoard of criminal
cash derived from the specified crimes . . . . This draconian law, so powerful
by its elimination of criminal intent, freezes the proceeds of specific crimes out
of the banking system.”143
Thus, for example, if a teaching physician at an academic medical center
engaged in mail fraud or wire fraud arising from reimbursement claims
submitted to Medicare for treatment of Medicare patients by a resident when
the teaching physician was not present, and the physician loaned a friend
money which the teaching physician received as reimbursement from Medicare
because of such claims, the physician has violated § 1956 if she made the
loan144 with one of the following intents: (1) to promote the fraud scheme, (2)
to engage in tax fraud or tax evasion, (3) to conceal the source of the funds, (4)
to avoid a cash reporting requirement. As one might imagine, it would be
difficult to prove that the physician made the loan with one of the
aforementioned intents, and thus difficult to prove a violation of § 1956.
It would be easier to prove a violation of § 1957. If a teaching physician at
an academic medical center engaged in mail fraud or wire fraud arising form
reimbursement claims submitted to Medicare for treatment of Medicare
patients by a resident when the teaching physician was not present, and the
physician deposited an amount greater than $10,000 of Medicare
reimbursement into her bank account,145 the physician has violated § 1957.
Although § 1957 carries a lighter term of imprisonment than § 1956 (ten versus
twenty years), conviction of either offense requires mandatory forfeiture of
property “involved in” or “traceable” to such an offense.146 Thus, the clinic or
office at which the physician saw the patients at issue would be forfeited.

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

132 F.2d 662 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 666-67.
Id. at 666.
United States v. Rutgard, 108 F.3d 1014, 1062 (9th Cir. 1997).
A loan is a “financial transaction” within the meaning of § 1956. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956.
Which is a “monetary transaction” within the meaning of § 1957. See 18 U.S.C. § 1957.
See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”): 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1961-1964

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”), passed in
1970,147 creates a criminal offense and a civil cause of action.148 The federal
government serves as prosecutor if criminal liability is sought.149 The federal
government, or any person injured in his or her business or property by the
RICO violation, may serve as plaintiff and bring a civil RICO action.150 Most
RICO cases are civil.151
Regardless of whether the RICO case is civil or criminal or the plaintiff is
the government or a private citizen, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant
engaged in a “pattern of racketeering activity.”152 A variety of state crimes
(murder, robbery, bribery, extortion, illegal drug dealing) and over sixty
federal crimes (ranging from drug dealing and gambling to white collar
offenses) constitute “racketeering activity.”153 The “pattern” of racketeering
activity may be shown with proof that acts were related to each other through
the “same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims or methods of
commission;” that there was a threat of the acts continuing; or that the
“offenses are part of an ongoing entity’s regular way of doing business.”154
The RICO plaintiff must show that at least one of the following types of
conduct took place and that such conduct affected interstate commerce:
(1) the defendant invested in an “enterprise,” monies received through the
pattern of racketeering activity;
(2) the defendant acquired or maintained control of an “enterprise” through a
pattern of racketeering activity;
(3) the defendant, who was employed by or associated with an “enterprise,”
conducted or participated in the affairs of the enterprise through a pattern of
racketeering activity; or
(4) the defendant conspired to do any of the above.155

147. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, § 901(a), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964 (1994 & Supp.
III 1997).
148. See WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, RELATED ACTIONS, supra note 121, at ch. 21. Other
excellent sources on RICO include PAUL A. BATISTA, CIVIL RICO PRACTICE MANUAL (2d ed.
1997) and KEVIN P. RODDY, RICO IN BUSINESS & COMMERCIAL LITIGATION (1991).
149. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1994).
150. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964(b) (1994).
151. U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE COURTS, Table C-2, Civil Cases Commenced
1994-1998; Table D-2, Criminal Cases Commenced 1994-1998.
152. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1994).
153. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
154. H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240-42 (1989).
155. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1994).
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An “enterprise” includes “any individual, partnership, corporation, association
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact
. . . .”156
The penalties for violating RICO are formidable. If convicted of a RICO
violation, a defendant may be imprisoned for up to twenty years and shall
forfeit any interest acquired or maintained in violation of RICO and any
property derived from a RICO violation.157 If found civilly liable under RICO,
a defendant faces mandatory treble damages, attorneys fees and costs.158 In
addition, courts are given broad power “to prevent and restrain” RICO
violations by ordering divesture of any interest in any enterprise, or by
imposing “reasonable” restrictions on future activities of a person engaged in
RICO violations.159
Health care fraud prosecutors have used RICO to prosecute physicians
who conspire with attorneys and patients to submit false claims to insurers,160
physicians who dispense unnecessary prescriptions of controlled substances,161
and physicians who conspire to submit false claims for medical services not
rendered,162 among others. Civilly, RICO has been used in a wide variety of
instances: for example, by a home health care company suing the billing
company which processed the company’s bills for “fraudulently submit[ting]
claims for reimbursement on [its] behalf . . . to Medicare, Medicaid, and other
third-party payor insurance companies;”163 by investors who purchased limited
partnership interests in a Magnetic Resonance Imaging center and sued the
sellers, alleging misrepresentations regarding ownership and leasing
arrangements;164 by an insurance company against physicians who allegedly
conspired to defraud the company;165 and by a physician against a hospital
which terminated him as medical director.166
Through careful pleading, a RICO offense under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) can
be proven simply by showing that a teaching physician used his office or clinic
(the “enterprise”) to engage in mail fraud or wire fraud (the “pattern of
racketeering activity”) arising from submission of reimbursement claims to
Medicare for treatment by residents of Medicare patients when the teaching
156. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1994).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994).
158. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
159. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(a) (1994).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Console, 13 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v.
Neely, 980 F.2d 1074, 1077 (2d Cir. 1992) (involving claims of fictitious automobile accidents).
161. See, e.g., United States v. Hughes, 895 F.2d 1135, 1138-39 (6th Cir. 1990).
162. See, e.g., United States v. Worthington, 698 F.2d 820, 821 (6th Cir. 1983).
163. VNA Plus, Inc. v. APRIA Healthcare Group, Inc., 29 F. Supp.2d. 1253, 1257 (D. Kan.
1998).
164. Gubitosi v. Zegeye, 28 F. Supp.2d 298, 300-01 (E.D. Pa. 1998).
165. Zenith Ins. Co. v. Breslaw, 108 F.3d 205, 206 (9th Cir. 1997).
166. Khurana v. Innovative Health Care Sys., Inc., 130 F.3d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1997).
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physician was not physically present. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1963, the office or
clinic used by the physician would be subject to mandatory forfeiture.
g.

Conspiracy: 18 U.S.C. §§ 371 and 286

Conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to commit an
unlawful act.167 The essence of the conspiracy offense is the agreement itself,
not acts taken in furtherance of the agreement.168 Conspiracy is a criminal
offense when the object of the conspiracy is the commission of a crime.169 The
crime of conspiracy arises from certain planning activities that precede the
actual commission of crime. Generally, three elements must be proven to
show that a conspiracy exists: (1) an agreement between two or more persons
to commit an illegal act, (2) an intent to commit the illegal act, (3) the
commission of at least one overt act by one co-conspirator in furtherance of tile
conspiracy.170
Some conspiracy statutes are limited to certain agreements. For example,
the general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 371, prohibits only
conspiracies to commit an offense against the United States, either by agreeing
to violate a federal criminal law or by agreeing to defraud the United States.171
Another federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 286, prohibits only conspiracies to submit
false claims to the government.172
Sections 371 and 286 are the federal conspiracy offenses used most often
in health care fraud prosecutions. Although the two offenses are similar, there
are differences. Section 286 proscribes only certain conspiracies against the
United States, those involving efforts to obtain payment for false, fictitious or
fraudulent claims.173 Section 371, in contrast, proscribes conspiracies to
commit an offense against the United States or to defraud the United States.174
Section 286 is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years,
while § 371 is punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years
when the object of the conspiracy is a felony, but is a misdemeanor, punishable
by a maximum term of imprisonment of one year when the underlying offense

167. United States v. Falcone, 311 U.S. 205, 210 (1940); Williamson v. United States, 207
U.S. 425, 447 (1908).
168. Braverman v. United States, 317 U.S. 49, 53 (1942).
169. Conspiracy may be a civil cause of action when the object of the conspiracy is a tort and
the conspiracy causes proximate damage to the plaintiff. PAMELA H. BUCY, WHITE COLLAR
CRIME: CASES AND MATERIALS 5 (2d ed. 1998).
170. United States v. Gold, 743 F.2d 800, 824 (11th Cir. 1984).
171. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1994); United States v. Minarik, 875 F.2d 1186, 1187 (6th Cir. 1989);
United States v. Touhey, 867 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1989).
172. See id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 286 (1994).
173. Id.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 371.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

26

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

is a misdemeanor.175 Lastly, § 286 has no “overt act” requirement, while
§ 371 retains such a requirement.176 Because of these differences, the
prohibition against double jeopardy does not apply if the government chooses
to prosecute a defendant under both § 286 and § 381.177
h.

Theft of Government Property: 18 U.S.C. § 641

Most federal efforts to prosecute health care fraud as theft employ 18
U.S.C. § 641.178 Because § 641 provides one of the few misdemeanor offenses
in the federal system, it can be of unique assistance to defense counsel in
negotiating a plea bargain with the prosecutor.179 Whereas a felony conviction
may subject a licensed health care provider to licensure discipline (revocation,
suspension, reprimand) a misdemeanor conviction may not. Misdemeanor use
of § 641 will be available more often in health care fraud cases than in other
types of fraud. With many types of fraud (defense fraud for example) each
false statement involves a large sum of money. By comparison, although the
total amount of loss per fraud scheme may be large, health care fraud usually is
committed in small dollar increments ($2 per claim form, for example). This
makes bringing a charge under the misdemeanor provision of § 641 a viable
option in most health care cases.
Section 641 will be violated every time § 287 or § 1001 are violated, and
can be used interchangeably or in addition to such charges.

175. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 286.
176. United States v. Lanier, 920 F.2d 887, 892-93 (11th Cir. 1991).
177. Id. at 893-94.
178. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1994 & Supp. III 1997) provides:
Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins . . . any record, voucher, money, or thing of value of
the United Sates or of any department of agency thereof . . . [s]hall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both; but if the value of such property does
not exceed the sum of $1000, he shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than one year, or both.
The word value means “face, par, or market value, or cost price either wholesale or retail,
whichever is greater.” 18 U.S.C. § 641. Other provisions of § 641 prohibit converting property
of the United States to one’s use or the use of another. Further, § 641 prohibits receiving,
concealing, or retaining property obtained in one of the proscribed ways. Neither of these
provisions apply to health care fraud as directly as the theft provision. See, e.g., United States v.
Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 256 (5th Cir. 1990).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 1003 provides another misdemeanor applicable to some instances of health
care fraud. Section 1003 makes it a crime to “knowingly and fraudulently demand [or endeavor]
to obtain any share or sum in the public stocks of the United States.” When the amount obtained
does not exceed $1000, the punishment for violating § 1003 is a misdemeanor. Manocchio v.
Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1992).
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Obstruction of Justice and Perjury

Counsel for defendants, targets, subjects, and witnesses should be aware of
obstruction of justice and perjury statutes when advising clients during pretrial
or trial stages of a case. Given the breadth of these statutes, there may be a
thin line between violating the law and performing proper attorney functions
such as preparing a witness for cross-examination, advising a client not to
volunteer information or to answer only when certain of the facts.180
There are over twenty federal statutes addressing obstruction of justice and
perjury. The statutes most relevant in health care fraud cases are 18 U.S.C.
§ 1503 (influencing or injuring an officer or juror); 18 U.S.C. § 1505
(obstructing proceedings before departments, agencies and congressional
committees); 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (tampering with a witness); and 18 U.S.C. §
1622 (suborning perjury). All of these offenses are felonies, punishable by
maximum terms of imprisonment of five years.181 To protect client and
counsel from an obstruction of justice prosecution, counsel should caution
clients not to destroy evidence that is sought or may be sought in an
investigation, and not to discuss issues under investigation since such
discussions could be viewed as influencing a witness if the person is later
called as a witness. Counsel should ensure that giving advice to clients is not,
and is not perceived as, obstructing justice.
One obstruction of justice statute bears special attention. “Obstruction of
criminal investigations of health care offenses,” found at 18 U.S.C. § 1518,
was created under HIPAA in 1996.182 This statute prohibits willfully
attempting to or obstructing, misleading or delaying “the communication of
information or records relating to a violation of a Federal health care
offense.”183 Because of HIPAA’s integrated approach to health care fraud, a
violation of § 1518 activates additional liability under money laundering and
forfeiture statutes. Pursuant to HIPAA’s amendment to the money laundering
offense,184 § 1518 is a “specified unlawful activity,” subjecting those who
obstruct health care fraud investigations to money laundering prosecutions if
other elements of money laundering are met.185 This is significant since
money laundering offenses subject offenders to especially lengthy sentences
180. See, e.g., United States v. Poppers, 635 F. Supp. 1034, 1036 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 1505 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 1512
(1994 & Supp. III 1997); 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (1994). However, 18 U.S.C. § 1512(c), regarding
harassment of a witness, is a misdemeanor offense, and subjects the offender to a maximum term
of one year imprisonment.
182. HIPAA § 245(a), 110 Stat. at 2017-18 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1518 (Supp.
III 1997)).
183. Id.
184. 18 U.S.C. § 1956 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
185. HIPAA § 246, 110 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F)
(1994 & Supp. III 1997)).
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under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.186 In addition, pursuant to HIPAA’s
amendment to the criminal forfeiture provision found at 18 U.S.C. § 982, a
conviction of obstructing a health care investigation subjects one to mandatory
forfeiture of property which “constitutes or is derived, directly or indirectly,
from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the [§ 1518].”187
j.

Health Care Fraud: 18 U.S.C. § 1347

Created by HIPAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1347 is modeled after the mail fraud and
wire fraud statutes.188 Like the mail and wire fraud statutes, which cover fraud
upon private victims, not just the government, 18 U.S.C. § 1347, through the
definition of “health care benefit program,”189 covers fraud upon private payers
as well as upon public insurers. Although § 1347 requires an effect upon
commerce,190 while the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes do not,191 it is
broader than the mail fraud or wire fraud statutes in other ways. Section 1347
does not require a mailing or use of an interstate carrier as does the mail fraud
offense,192 nor does it require use of interstate wire communications as does
the wire fraud offense.193

186. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2S1.1 (1998); 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F)
(Supp. III 1997).
187. HIPAA § 249, 110 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (Supp. III
1997)). See also text accompanying note 108.
188. HIPAA § 242, 110 Stat. at 2016 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1347 (Supp. III
1997)). Section 1347 provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice —
(1) to defraud any health care benefit program; or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretense, representations, or promises, any
of the money or property owned by, or under the custody or control of, any health care
benefit program, in connection with the delivery of or payment for health care benefits,
items or services, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or
both. If the violation results in serious bodily injury . . . such person shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both; and if the violation results in
death, such person shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned for any term of years or
for life, or both.
189. The term “health care benefit program” means “any public or private plan or contract,
affecting commerce, under which any medical benefit, item, or service is provided to any
individual, and includes any individual or entity who is providing a medical benefit, item or
service for which payment may be made under the plan or contract.” HIPAA § 241(a), 110 Stat.
at 2016 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 24 (Supp. III 1997)).
190. See id.
191. Although neither the mail fraud nor wire fraud statutes require an effect on interstate
commerce as does § 1347, the mail fraud statute requires that items sent by private carrier must
be sent or delivered by an interstate private carrier, and the wire fraud statute requires that the
wire transmissions or signals be sent by an interstate carrier. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343.
192. See id.; 18 U.S.C. § 1341.
193. See supra note 188; 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
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As with the other criminal offenses created by HIPAA, § 1347 is integrated
into existing money laundering and forfeiture statutes as a “specified unlawful
activity,” thereby qualifying those who violate § 1347 for prosecution as
money launderers.194 As noted, conviction for money laundering subjects an
offender to a substantially longer sentence than does conviction for fraud.195
Also, pursuant to HIPAA’s amendment of the criminal forfeiture provision
found at 18 U.S.C. § 982, conviction of § 1347 subjects one to mandatory
forfeiture of any property which “constitutes or is derived, directly or
indirectly, from gross proceeds traceable to the commission of the [§ 1347].”196
k.

Theft or Embezzlement in Connection with Health Care: 18 U.S.C. §
669

Created under HIPAA, 18 U.S.C. § 669 provides:
Whoever knowingly and willfully embezzles, steals, or otherwise without
authority converts to the use of any person other than the rightful owner, or
intentionally misapplies any of the moneys, funds, securities, premiums,
credits, property, or other assets of a health care benefit program, shall be fined
under this title197 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; but if the
value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100 the defendant shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.198

Although modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 641, which makes it a crime to embezzle,
steal or convert property or a thing of value belonging to the United States, §
669 exceeds the scope of § 641. Through its reference to “health care benefit
program,” § 669 covers fraud upon private insurers as well as upon
Like § 641, however, § 669 provides a
governmental programs.199
misdemeanor option for charging health care fraud.200 Thus, it could be an
important option for defendants during plea negotiations.
Like the other crimes created by HIPAA, § 669 is included as “specified
unlawful activity,” subjecting those who violate it to prosecution for money
laundering, which carries a stiffer prison sentence than do most fraud offenses.

194. HIPAA § 246, 110 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F)
(Supp. III 1997)).
195. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, supra note 186, § 2S1.1.
196. HIPAA § 249, 110 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)). See also
text accompanying note 108.
197. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3571-3574.
198. See HIPAA § 243(a), 110 Stat. at 2017 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 669 (Supp.
III 1997)).
199. For the definition of “health care benefit program” see supra note 189.
200. See 18 U.S.C. § 669. “[I]f the value of such property does not exceed the sum of $100
the defendant shall be fined . . . or imprisoned not more than a year, or both.”
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Also, pursuant to HIPAA amending the forfeiture provisions,201 conviction of
§ 669 subjects one to mandatory forfeiture of any “property . . . that constitutes
or is derived . . . from gross proceeds traceable to commission of [§ 669].”202
l.

False Statements Relating to Health Care Matters: 18 U.S.C. § 1035

Created by HIPAA, 18 U.S.C. § 1035 makes it a crime to make a false
statement or conceal material facts in connection with the delivery or payment
for health care benefits.203 Although modeled after 18 U.S.C. § 1001, which
makes it an offense to make false and fraudulent statements to the federal
government, 18 U.S.C. § 1035 has two notable differences from § 1001. First,
like all other new health care fraud crimes, § 1035 reaches fraud upon private
as well as public insurers. Section 1001 is limited to fraud upon the federal
government.204 Second, presumably because of the clarification given to the
materiality element of § 1001 in recent court decisions,205 § 1035 (unlike §
1001) clearly sets forth materiality as an element to be proven by the
government.206
Like the other crimes created by HIPAA, § 1035 is a “specified unlawful
activity” subjecting those who commit it to money laundering prosecutions.207
Also, pursuant to HIPAA’s amendment to the criminal forfeiture provision, a
conviction of § 1035 subjects one to mandatory forfeiture of property which
“constitutes or is derived, directly, from gross proceeds traceable to the
commission of [§ 1035].”208

201. HIPAA § 249, 110 Stat. 2020 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (Supp. III
1997)). See also text accompanying note 108.
202. Id.
203. 18 U.S.C. § 1035 (Supp. III 1997) provides:
Whoever, in any matter involving a health care benefit program, knowingly and willfully
–
(1) falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device a material fact; or
(2) makes any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statements or representations, or
makes or uses any materially false writing or document knowing the same to contain any
materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, in connection with the
delivery of or payment for health care benefits, items, or services, shall be fined . . . or
imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.
204. For the definition of “health care benefit program,” see supra note 189.
205. See, e.g., United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
206. See 18 U.S.C. § 1035(a)(2) (prohibiting the knowing and willful making of “any
materially false of fictitious statement) (emphasis added).
207. See HIPAA § 246, 110 Stat. at 2018 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7)(F)
(Supp. III 1997)).
208. See text accompanying note 108; HIPAA § 249, 110 Stat. at 2020 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. § 982(a) (Supp. III 1997)); see also BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3,
§ 3.02[15][c].
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m. The Anti-kickback Statute: 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)
The federal health care anti-kickback statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b),
affects almost every business arrangement by and among health care providers.
It is a criminal statute intended to prohibit inducements for patient referrals;
violations are punishable by a maximum term of imprisonment of five years.209
Originally, the anti-kickback statute applied only to referrals “for an item or
service for which payment may be made in whole or in part under [Medicare
or Medicaid].”210 Effective January 1, 1997, however, the anti-kickback
statute was expanded to reach violations related to items or services provided
under all federal health care programs, notably health coverage for military
personnel and their dependents through the Civilian Health and Medical
Program for the Uniformed Services (“CHAMPUS”).211 In pertinent part, the
anti-kickback statute prohibits any person from:
(1) Knowingly and willfully soliciting or receiving “remuneration,” directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, in return for a referral for program-reimbursable
items or services; or
(2) knowingly and willfully offering or giving “remuneration,” directly or
indirectly, overtly or covertly, with the intent to induce referrals for programreimbursable items or services.212

Controversy has surrounded the anti-kickback statute for several reasons.
First, the statute prohibits what is a legitimate, if not valued, business tactic
outside the health care field. Providers argue that such conduct should not be
criminalized.213 Second, court interpretations of the anti-kickback statute have
lurched from expansive214 to restrictive,215 making it difficult for providers to
conduct day-to-day business transactions without violating the statute. Third,
qui tam relators as well as the federal government have brought actions under
the False Claims Act (FCA)216 alleging, as the falsity, violations of the anti-

209. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
210. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994).
211. However, federal employee health benefit plans are not included as “federal health care
programs.” See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(f)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
212. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
213. See BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, § 2.13[1].
214. See, e.g., United States v. Greber, 760 F.2d 68 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 988
(1985) (stating that “if one purpose of the payment [between providers] was to induce future
referrals, the Medicare statute has been violated.”) (emphasis added). See also United States v.
Kats, 871 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1989) (“material purpose”); United States v. Bay State Ambulance &
Hosp. Rental Serv., Inc., 874 F.2d 20 (1st Cir. 1989) (“primary purpose”).
215. See, e.g., Hanlester Network v. Shalala, 51 F.3d 1390 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the
government must prove that a defendant acted with willful violation of a “known legal duty.”).
216. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (1994).
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kickback statute. Many health care providers view this coupling of the FCA
and the anti-kickback statute as exceeding the scope of either statute.217
n.

Retaining Overpayments: 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)

Under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3), it is a crime to conceal the fact that one
may have received federal health care funds erroneously. This statute
provides:
Whoever . . . having knowledge of the occurrence of any event affecting . . .
his initial or continued right to any . . . benefit [under a Federal health care
program] . . . conceals or fails to disclose such event with an intent
fraudulently to secure such benefit or payment either in a greater amount or
quantity than is due . . . shall . . . be guilty of a felony and upon conviction be
fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years or
both.218

The coverage of this statute is unclear, especially since there is no legislative
history regarding it and no completed prosecutions to date under it.219
However, its terms are broad. It appears to cover, for example, an instance
where a provider learns that it was overpaid by Medicare because of incorrect
billing codes accidentally submitted by the provider. If the provider fails to
come forward and reveal the overpayment, is the provider guilty under this
statute? Presumably so, for even if the funds originally were received through
innocent mistake, once the provider decides to retain the overpayment, he has
fraudulently retained the funds.
2. State Crimes
a. Conspiracy
Conspiracy is a common charge in state prosecutions of health care
fraud.220 In state prosecutions, as in federal prosecutions of health care fraud,
the advantages for the government of the conspiracy charge are gaining
admission of otherwise inadmissible hearsay221 and combining far-flung actors

217. Robert Fabrikant & Glenn E. Solomon, Application of the Federal False Claims Act to
Regulatory Compliance Issues in the Healthcare Industry, 51 ALA. L. REV. 105, 106 (2000).
218. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
219. See Ronald J. Nessim, Health Care Disclosure Statute: What Does It Mean?, CRIM.
JUST. 34-39 (Winter 1999).
220. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Askin, 452 A.2d 851 (Pa. Super. 1982), modified by 467
A.2d 820 (1993); State v. Burnett, 556 A.2d 1251 (N.J. 1989); State v. Toscano, 378 A.2d 755
(N.J. 1977); People v. Varas, 487 N.Y.S.2d 577 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); State v. Poganski, 257
N.W.2d 578 (Minn. 1977); State v. Lawrence, 212 S.E.2d 52 (S.C. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S.
1025 (1975); People v. Marsh, 376 P.2d 300 (Cal. 1962); People v. Chapman, 24 Cal. Rptr. 568
(Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1962).
221. See, e.g., Chapman, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 580.
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and actions into one case.222 As in the federal courts, proof of the agreement
may be by circumstantial evidence.223 At least some states require proof of
specific intent to violate the law on the part of all conspirators.224
b. Medicaid Fraud
Although historically most health care fraud prosecutions have been
handled by federal prosecutors, states have been active in prosecuting health
care fraud for twenty years through Medicaid Fraud Control Units
(MFCUs).225 When state prosecutors bring charges against health care
providers for fraud, they use a variety of statutes including Medicaid fraud,
theft, larceny, obtaining money by false pretenses and forgery.226 Medicaid
fraud is the most consistent charge employed by state prosecutors227 and a
number of states have statutes specifically directed at Medicaid fraud.228 Most
such statutes are of recent vintage and contain at least the following elements:
prohibition of false statements and/or false claims; prohibition of kickbacks for
referrals; a dual penalty track—misdemeanor punishment when larger amounts
of money are involved; required access to provider’s records for governments
fraud investigators; restitution; mandatory exclusion from the Medicaid
program; and substantial civil penalties.
Intent is the most heavily litigated issue under the Medicaid fraud statutes
and the various state statutes’ intent language is considerably diverse. Some
Medicaid fraud statutes explicitly require proof of a high level of intent.
Louisiana, for example, requires proof of “intent to defraud the state.”229
222. See, e.g., Toscano, 378 A.2d at 756.
223. Varas, 487 N.Y.S.2d at 580.
224. Marsh, 26 Cal. Rptr. at 303.
225. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
226. Pamela H. Bucy, Fraud by Fright: White Collar Crime by Health Care Providers, 67
N.C. L. REV. 855, 883 (1989).
227. Id.
228. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-55-103 (Michie 1997); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17b99 (West 1998); D.C. CODE ANN. § 3-702 (1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.920 (1998); HAW.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 346-43.5 (Michie 1999); 30 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 105/5.223 (West 1993);
IND. CODE ANN. § 35-43-5-7.1 (Michie 1998 & Supp. 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 205.8463
(Michie 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:70.1 (West 1997 & Supp. 1999); MD. CODE ANN.,
HEALTH-GEN. I § 15-123 (1994 & Supp. 1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 400.601 (West
1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-13-201 (1993); MO. REV. STAT. § 191.900-910 (West 1996);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 53-6-111 (1999); NEV. REV. STAT. § 422.540 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 167:58; (1994 & Supp. 1998) N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-17 (West 1997); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 30-44-1 (Michie 1997); N.Y. SOC. SERV. § 145-b (McKinney 1992); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2913.40 (West 1997); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 56, § 1001 (West 1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
62, § 1407 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 40-8.2-1 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 71-5-118
(1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-20-7 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 141 (1991); W. VA. CODE
§ 9-7-1 (1998).
229. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:70.1 (West 1998 & Supp. 1999).
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Louisiana courts hold that the statute’s intent requirement requires proof of
“specific intent”: proof that the “offender must have actively desired the
prescribed criminal consequence . . . .”230 Michigan, by comparison, requires
proof that the defendant acted “knowing[ly].”231 Although Michigan courts
claim that the statute’s language requires proof of “specific intent,” they appear
to dilute any specific intent requirement. For example, in People v. American
Medical Centers of Michigan, Ltd.,232 the Michigan Court of Appeals held that
“specific intent” may be shown with evidence that the defendant “was aware of
his conduct and that his conduct was substantially certain to cause the intended
result.”233
c. Anti-kickback Statutes
A number of states have anti-kickback statutes,234 most of which are
modeled after the federal anti-kickback statute.235 Some statutes include civil
penalties and revocation of professional licenses as penalties.236 Prosecution
under state anti-kickback statutes may become more common if, as recent
court action indicates, the federal anti-kickback statute is interpreted as
requiring strong proof of criminal intent before the federal statute is
violated.237

230. State v. Cargille, 507 So.2d 1254 (La. Ct. App. 1987). See also Greco v. State, 148 A.2d
164 (N.J. 1959), which typifies many courts’ insistence on strong proof of intent. In Greco, the
Supreme Court of New Jersey set aside the conviction of a physician on the ground that because
of confusing regulations, the government failed to prove that the defendant “knowingly or
designedly, with the intent to cheat or defraud” submitted false bills. The court counseled: “Our
ultimate conclusion is based upon the firm doctrine of our criminal law that it must be shown that
a defendant knew of the falsity of his representations before he can be convicted of the crime of
obtaining money by false pretenses.” Id. at 169.
231. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 400.607(2) (West 1997).
232. 324 N.W.2d 782 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982).
233. Id. at 792. See also People v. Slocum, 125 Cal. Rptr. 442, 456-57 (Cal. Ct. App. 1975)
(interpreting California’s Medicaid fraud statute as requiring proof of specific intent that could be
satisfied with evidence that defendant submitted “false claims forms pursuant to one scheme or
plan to defraud”).
234. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-1-11(b), (c) (Michie 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-5-111(6),
(7) (Michie 1997); CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 650 (West 1990 & Supp. 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 395.0185 (West 1998); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27 § 230B(b)(5) (1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN.§ 752.1004 (1991); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-13-207 (1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 198.145
(West 1996); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-17(c) (West 1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3999.22
(West 1995 & Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 49.49(2) (West 1997 & Supp. 1998).
235. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-1-11(b),(c); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-17(c); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 32.315(A), (B) (Michie 1997).
236. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-77-902(6),(7); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-6-15(D)(15),(E)
(Michie 1999).
237. See Hanlester, 51 F.3d at 1400. For a discussion of Hanlester, see BUCY, HEALTH CARE
FRAUD, supra note 3, § 1.04[3].
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C. Statutes Imposing Civil Liability for Health Care Fraud
The False Claims Act (“FCA”), originally passed in 1863 and amended
significantly since, is one of the most potent weapons available to the
government to combat health care fraud.238 The FCA gives the federal
government a cause of action for damages against those who file false claims
with the federal government.239 What makes the FCA unusual, however, is
that it also gives any “person” a cause of action against those who file false
claims with the federal government. This private plaintiff, known as the “qui
tam” relator, does not have to demonstrate damage or harm to himself or
herself to obtain standing.240 Rather, courts have held that the relator acquires
standing through an assignment theory (the federal government as the harmed
party assigns relators the opportunity to participate in the suit)241 or a personal
stake theory (the relator has sufficient interest in the lawsuit because of the
portion of the judgment or costs the relator may share).242
The qui tam provision of the FCA is a “private attorney general” approach
to law enforcement.243 By offering to share a portion of its recovery from a
successful lawsuit with private parties, the FCA encourages those who know
about fraud, or have the ability to learn about fraud, to come forward with
information. Such a rationale is well suited to fraud cases and especially well
suited to health care fraud, which is complex and often known only to insiders.
Industry insiders, whether employees or competitors, are in a position to see
what the government is incapable of detecting or adequately investigating as an
outsider.244 The decentralization of many businesses, the complexity of
applicable regulations, the challenge of following the paper trail, the many
individuals within a business who may participate, even unwittingly, in a
fraud, make the knowledge and assistance of an insider almost essential to a
successful fraud investigation, certainly to an efficient investigation.245
Recognizing the value of an insider’s knowledge and the risk insiders often
take when coming forward with information about a fraud, the FCA rewards

238. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 121, at 1-5.
239. See 29 U.S.C. § 3730(a)-(b).
240. WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, RELATED ACTIONS, supra note 121, § 27.9.
241. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Milam v. University of Tex. M.D. Anderson Cancer Ctr.,
961 F.2d 46, 49 (4th Cir. 1992); United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 748 (9th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1140 (1994).
242. See United States ex rel. Kriendler v. United Techs. Corp., 985 F.2d 1148, 1153 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 973 (1993); United States ex rel. Givler v. Smith, 775 F. Supp. 172,
181 (E.D. Pa. 1991).
243. WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, RELATED ACTIONS, supra note 121, § 27.9.
244. See id. § 27.10.
245. “The billing process itself, and the paperwork necessary to monitor numerous and
complex third party contracts . . . boggles the mind.” BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3,
§ 1.04[2] (citation omitted).
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insiders well, allocating to relators up to 30% of the recovery in any FCA
lawsuit.246 Since the FCA was amended in 1986, over 2,900 qui tam cases
have been filed, with the number quickly increasing, from 33 cases in Fiscal
Year (“FY”) 1987, for example, to 483 cases in FY 1999.247 Since 1987, total
qui tam recoveries have exceeded $2.915 billion; the average relator’s share in
qui tam cases where there has been a recovery is $1 million.248 The FCA has
been used increasingly in health care cases by qui tam relators: in 1987, only
12% of qui tam FCA cases involved HHS as the client agency; in 1998, 61%
of qui tam FCA cases involved HHS as the client agency.249
Because of its dual plaintiff system, the procedure followed in FCA cases
is unique among all federal causes of action. When a relator files an FCA
complaint, the relator must file the complaint under seal and must furnish the
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) with a copy of the complaint and
“substantially all material evidence and information” the relator possesses.250
It is to the relator’s advantage to make a thorough, comprehensive, and
persuasive statement of the case to the government in this submission, so as to
persuade the government to join as plaintiff. One study of all qui tam actions
filed between 1986-1996 revealed that “the average recovery for qui tam cases
where the government intervened [was] approximately $6 million whereas the
average recovery for qui tam cases where the government declined to intervene
was approximately $33,000.”251
Although the FCA provides for a sixty-day sealing period,252 the seal is
often extended for eighteen to twenty-four months.253 This sealing leaves the
odd result that, for this entire time period, the defendant may remain unaware
that it has been named in a lawsuit that could subject it to substantial financial
penalties.254 During the time the complaint is sealed, and before the DOJ
decides whether to join the lawsuit as a plaintiff, the DOJ may conduct

246. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1)-(2). If the government decides to proceed with the qui tam
action, the relator may receive between fifteen to twenty-five percent of the total recovery from
the action; however, if the government decides not to proceed, the relator may receive between
twenty-five and thirty percent.
247. Taxpayers Against Fraud, Qui Tam Statistics (last modified Nov. 1999)
<http://www.taf.org/taf/docs/qtstats99.html> (citing statistics as reported by the United States
Department of Justice).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
251. Frederick M. Levy & Gregory T. Jaeger, The Qui Tam Provisions a Decade Later—The
Case for Reform, NAT’L INST. ON HEALTH CARE FRAUD E-19 (1997).
252. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
253. The government “may for good cause shown, move the court for extensions of the time
during with which the complaint remains under seal . . . .” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3). See also
BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 121, at 4-101 to 4-104.
254. Cf. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 121, at 4-107.
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discovery: depositions, interrogatories, and requests for production of
documents, all through Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs).255 A defendant
may become aware that it has been named in an FCA lawsuit through CIDs or
by virtue of a partial or full lifting of the seal, but this is not always true.256
Even if a defendant becomes generally aware that it has been named in an FCA
lawsuit, it will have no information as to the allegations or scope of the charges
or the identity of the relator.257
As can be seen, these aspects of an FCA case resemble a criminal case.
Like an FCA defendant named in a sealed complaint, a criminal defendant may
be the target of a grand jury investigation, even named in a sealed indictment,
without knowing of his or her status. Also by using CIDs, the government in
an FCA case is able to conduct discovery unilaterally and secretly, if it
chooses, prior to joining as plaintiff. This process of unilateral discovery is
similar to the grand jury process, in which the government conducts secret
discovery prior to filing criminal charges.
Perhaps the most unusual aspect of the FCA is its “jurisdictional bar”
provision.258 To qualify as a qui tam relator, a private party must overcome
this bar:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action . . . based upon the public
disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or administrative
hearing, in a congressional, administrative, or Government Accounting Office
report, hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news media, unless the
action is brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is
an original source of the information.259

Thus, if information regarding the allegations in the FCA lawsuit has
become public before the relator files the complaint, the relator is
jurisdictionally barred from proceeding with the lawsuit unless the relator can
prove that he or she is the “original source” of the public disclosure.260 Even if
the relator is jurisdictionally barred, the case may continue with the federal
government as the only plaintiff.261 This provision advances the FCA’s goal:
qui tam actions are to encourage knowledgeable persons to bring to the
government’s attention instances of fraud against the government. If the
information is already public, this goal has been achieved. However, to
encourage relators to come forward and to provide information that is not yet

255. 31 U.S.C. § 3733.
256. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 121, at 1-5.
257. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2) (stating that “the complaint may not be served until the court
so orders”).
258. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A).
259. Id.
260. WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, RELATED ACTIONS, supra note 121, § 27.10.
261. Id.
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in the public domain, the FCA continues to reward those who can show that
they were an original source of the publicity.262
The jurisdictional bar provision substantially complicates an FCA case
involving relators. A relator must file his or her qui tam action prior to any
public disclosure of the fraud, or if public disclosure occurs, the relator must be
able to prove that her qui tam action is not based upon the public disclosure or
if it is, that her or she was the “original source” of the disclosure.263 To prove
that he or she is an original source, the relator must prove that he or she
obtained the information regarding the false claims “directly and
independently” and that he or she voluntarily provided such information to the
government.264 Not only are these questions highly fact specific and thus
difficult to predict, but the circuits are divided over the most basic questions of
jurisdictional bar jurisprudence.265
Failure to master the jurisdictional bar provision can be serious and prevent
a relator from participating in an FCA action. By the same token, failure to
argue adequately that a case is jurisdictionally barred can spell disaster for a
defendant when the relator is the only plaintiff in the FCA action (since the
entire case must be dismissed otherwise) and for the government when it joins
as plaintiff (and must share its recovery with a relator who otherwise would be
removed from the case).
Despite the complications the FCA poses for parties, especially relators,
the FCA has had an enormous impact on health care fraud for several reasons.
Among white collar cases, health care fraud stands out as complex to
investigate. The intricacy of applicable billing requirements, the sophistication
necessary to evaluate medical procedures and services, and the large size and
diffusion of duties common in many institutional health care providers make
health care fraud especially difficult to detect and prove.266 Industry insiders,
whether employees, competitors or business associates, are invaluable in
finding and proving such fraud. The FCA, with its large, statutory recoveries,
and promise to share any recovery with relators, provides an incentive for
insiders to come forward with information about fraud on Medicare and other
government programs.
In addition, the damage and penalty structure of the FCA delivers a
formidable punch in health care cases, more so than in cases involving many
other government programs. The FCA provides for a judgment of treble
damages, attorneys fees and costs, and a mandatory penalty of $5,000 262. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 121, at 1-5 to 1-14; WELLING, BEALE & BUCY,
RELATED ACTIONS, supra note 121, §§ 27.8, 27.10.
263. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS, supra note 121, at 4-29 to 4-63; WELLING, BEALE &
BUCY, RELATED ACTIONS, supra note 121, § 27.10.
264. Id.
265. WELLING, BEALE & BUCY, RELATED ACTIONS, supra note 121, § 27.10.
266. BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, § 1.04[2].
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$10,000 for each false claim.267 Because of the billing structure for most
health care services (one claim per service, per patient) even a small health
care provider will submit thousands of claims each year. Thus, even if the
amount of alleged fraud is a few cents per claim, rendering a minimal amount
of treble damages, the mandatory penalties of a minimum of $5,000 per claim
will be substantial. Considering such substantial penalties the DOJ and HHS
have been especially solicitous of qui tam relators. As the DOJ noted:
“Overall, the FCA has powerful and far reaching effects . . . . Qui tam . . . suits
have dramatically increased detection of and monetary recoveries for health
care fraud.”268
The FCA has been employed in the PATH initiative. Teaching hospitals
selected for audits allegedly have been told that if they choose not to
participate in the audit, the “alternative is litigation under the FCA.”269 The
teaching hospitals refer to the looming prospect of FCA liability as a “coercive
power . . . to extract ‘settlements’. . . .”270 In addition to any the FCA, of
course, is criminal liability under any number of the offenses outlined in Part
II.B of this article and the administrative sanctions set forth below.
D. Statutes Providing Administrative Sanctions for Health Care Fraud
Health care providers who are found to have committed fraud, after a
criminal conviction, a finding of civil liability, or an independent finding by an
Administrative Law Judge of the Department of Health and Human Services,
are subject to a variety of administrative sanctions271 including assessment of
penalties or exclusion from participating in Medicare and state health care
programs.272 Providers are subject to civil monetary penalties levied
administratively by HHS of up to $10,000 ($100,000 in some instances) for
each improper claim submitted to Medicare or state health care programs.273
Exclusion is often referred to as the “death penalty” for providers because
excluded providers cannot bill Medicare, Medicaid or any state health care
program for services. For most providers, exclusion closes them down.
Liability under the FCA during a PATH audit could subject a teaching hospital
and any of its offending physicians to both exclusion and penalties.

267. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
268. DOJ FRAUD REPORT FY 1997, supra note 95, at 6.
269. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 57. See also supra notes 76-79 and accompanying
text.
270. AAMC Complaint, supra note 10, ¶ 57.
271. For a more complete discussion of these administrative sanctions, see BUCY, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, §§ 5.01 to 5.06.
272. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.1 to 1001.3005 (1998).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (1994 & Supp. III 1997); 42 C.F.R. §§ 1003.100 to 1003.135
(1998).
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Although exclusion is catastrophic, suspension can be worse. At least with
exclusion and assessment of administrative penalties, procedures are in place
for providers to obtain a hearing and an appeal.274 However, carriers are also
authorized to suspend future payments to the provider immediately and
without a hearing whenever a provider has been apparently overpaid because
of the filing of false claims or otherwise.275
In addition to the above sanctions, a provider found to have submitted false
claims for reimbursement (either to public or private insurers) is subject to
orders to make restitution,276 revocation of his or her professional license, loss
of staff privileges at hospitals,277 and loss of his or her license to prescribe
certain medications.278
III. CONSIDERATION OF CULTURAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT
There is a large, aggressive law enforcement machine poised to pursue
health care fraud. Supplied with ample resources and powerful statutory
weapons including criminal statutes carrying twenty-year terms of
imprisonment and mandatory forfeiture, the FCA with its huge, statutorily set
monetary awards, and administrative sanctions that can demolish a health care
provider.
Many businesses operate on such a thin margin that any disruption erodes
their profitability, if not viability. Academic medical centers are especially
vulnerable to disruptions due to recent changes in the health care industry.
Before examining the general state of academic medical centers and how the
PATH audit, or any large scale investigation, disrupts their existence, it may be
helpful to review the PATH audit experience of one academic medical center.
The Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center (“Dartmouth”) underwent a
PATH audit despite the fact that the OIG had no indication that Dartmouth
physicians were improperly billing Medicare. In fact, the U.S. Department of
Justice official credited with creating the PATH initiative viewed Dartmouth’s
billing guidance for teaching physicians as “the best he had ever seen.”279
Once informed that it was selected for a PATH audit, Dartmouth opted for

274. 42 C.F.R. §§ 1001.2001 to 1001.2007 (1998).
275. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.801 to 405.877; § 1003.127 (1998) (outlining various appeal
processes).
276. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 117 F.3d 459 (11th Cir. 1997) The Davis defendants
convicted of Medicare fraud ordered to make restitution in the amounts of $9 million and $8
million, respectively. Joint and several liability affirmed on the ground that a defendant “is liable
for the foreseeable acts of co-conspirators.” Id. at 461.
277. For a discussion of the revocation of professional licenses and loss of staff privileges, see
BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, §§ 5.05 to 5.06.
278. 21 U.S.C. § 824(a)(5) (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a).
279. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 13.
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PATH II, thereby conducting the audit itself, pursuant to OIG guidelines.280
After approximately ten months, when about half of the sampled admissions
had been reviewed, OIG terminated the audit, finding no billing errors.281 By
that time, Dartmouth had spent approximately $1.7 million in conducting the
partial audit: $600,000 in audit expenses, $300,000 in legal fees and other
costs, and $800,000 in indirect costs attributable to a delay in obtaining bond
financing.282
The monetary costs associated with responding to a government audit,
while significant, are only one expense incurred by teaching hospitals or by
any business which becomes the target of a government investigation. Today,
most government health care fraud audits or investigations are conducted by a
team of investigators, including criminal investigators, auditors, billing
specialists, and medical specialists.283 The investigation may proceed through
grand jury subpoenas for records or testimony, Inspector General subpoenas
for records or testimony, Civil Investigative Demands (“CIDs”) for records or
testimony, search warrants, or agent interviews of employees, patients,
competitors or vendors.284 The target of such an investigation must devote
massive economic and human resources to respond to this investigation. The
investigative target must collect the required records, ensure that privileged
records are appropriately designated and segregated as privileged, and retain
adequate copies of records to carry on with business.285 Employees who are
interviewed by investigators, whether informally or through subpoenas or
CIDs, may require separate counsel.286 Often, the employer is obligated, or
simply deems it wise, to pay legal fees incurred by its employees.287
Employees and executives may be diverted from their usual duties to deal with
the human, logistical, business, public relations and financial issues that arise
during an investigation.288 Employees may leave for a less stressful
environment, and recruiting new staff may become difficult. As Dartmouth
found, obtaining financing for expansion or even continuation of business

280. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
281. OIG concluded that Dartmouth had been overpaid by $778, but did not view this as
worth collecting. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 14. Dartmouth contested the
conclusion that it had been overpaid. Id. at 28.
282. Id. at 4.
283. BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, § 6.01.
284. Id. §§ 6.03 to 6.06.
285. Id. § 6.07.
286. Separate counsel is necessary if there is a possibility of a conflict of interest with their
corporate employer. Id. § 6.08.
287. See generally Pamela H. Bucy, Indemnification of Corporate Executives Who Have Been
Convicted of Crimes: An Assessment and Proposal, 24 IND. L. REV. 279 (1991).
288. Leon Aussprung, Federal Civil Health Care Litigation and Settlement, 19 J. LEGAL
MED. 1, 26 (1998).
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during a large-scale investigation may become difficult.289 If the target is
publicly traded, stock prices may fall.
Maintaining continuity is crucial for any business, whether under
investigation or not. For health care providers who treat ill patients, continuity
during an investigation may become more than the financial bottom line: it
may be a life or death matter. Moreover, in a financially turbulent business
environment, the disruptions caused by government fraud investigations can be
especially serious. It is hard to imagine a sector of the American economy
which has experienced, and is still experiencing, more turmoil over the past
decade than the health care industry.
Because academic medical centers provide unique services for their local
communities, disruption of their mission has an unusually profound impact.
The 125 teaching hospitals associated with American medical schools perform
four unique functions: (1) they are the major source of biomedical research in
the world; (2) they provide the largest share of indigent health care in the
United States; (3) they treat unusual and complex medical problems, both
nationally and globally; and (4) they educate future physicians. No other
medical institution provides this combination of services. Yet, academic
medical centers are “in crisis” because the changing health care marketplace
has eroded their infrastructure.290 Over the past two decades, efforts to cut
health care costs have reduced revenues for virtually all health care providers.
For most private physicians, this cost consciousness has led to consolidation of
practices, reduced income and greater “management” of patients’ health care
by insurers.
For academic medical centers, the impact has been all of the above plus a
threat to teaching hospitals’ fundamental existence. For years these institutions
have cross-subsidized their research, education and indigent care activities
from patient revenues.291 As patient revenues decrease through managed care
and other cost consciousness initiatives, there is less revenue for teaching
hospitals to support these multiple missions. Robbing Peter to pay Paul is no
longer working.

289. GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH, supra note 2, at 14 n.26 (noting that “[a]ccording to
Dartmouth, investment banker and credit agency concerns about the possible outcome of the audit
delayed . . . bond financing, ultimately raising the total costs of this financing.”).
290. See Herbert Pardes, The Future of Medical Schools and Teaching Hospitals in the Era of
Managed Care, 72 ACAD. MED. 97, 97-98 (1997). John K. Inglehart, Rapid Changes for
Academic Medical Centers: Second of Two Parts, 332 NEW ENG. J. MED. 407, 411 (1995); David
Blumenthal & Gregg S. Meyer, The Future of the Academic Medical Center Under Health Care
Reform, 329 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1812 (1993).
291. See Pardes, supra note 290, at 98; Carey & Engelhard, supra note 1, at 842.
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Academic medical centers are the “backbone” of American biomedical
research, which is foremost in the world.292 “[M]ost of the nation’s basic and
clinical research advances are made” at the 125 American academic medical
centers.293 Over half of the research grants awarded by the National Institutes
of Health (“NIH”) go to these centers.294 Many of the scientific advances
made by American academic medical centers reduce expenses and improve the
quality of life for millions of people. For example, “[t]he annual cost of
treating polio if a vaccine had not been found is estimated at $30 billion per
year; [p]otassium citrate treatment for preventing recurrence of kidney stones
saves an estimated $400-870 million per year; [t]he vaccine to prevent
Haemophilus influenzae Type B (HiB) disease, the leading cause of bacterial
meningitis in the United States, saves an estimated $350 million to $450
million annually; [t]he heliobacter (H. pylori) discovery saves $600 million to
$800 million annually in the treatment of ulcers.”295 Academic medical
centers also test and develop surgical and patient care procedures that are
adopted world-wide.296
Despite its importance, the biomedical research mission of academic
medical centers is under severe strain. As one expert has noted, the financial
pressures currently existing in health care “could have a devastating impact on
the nation’s capacity to support medical research and education.”297 Studies
have shown that teaching hospitals located in regions of “high managed care
penetration have on average experienced a decreased rate of growth in NIH . . .
[research] awards during the past 5 years, as well as relative declines in their
overall ranking as awardee institutions and their market share of NIH
extramural awards.”298 As the changing marketplace has emphasized direct
patient care, academic physician-scientists have given up their attempt to do
clinical research: the “proportion of investigators applying for clinical research
grants from the National Institutes of Health (NIH) who are physicians has
declined from 40% [in 1968] to 25% [in 1998].”299 Studies also have shown
292. Pardes, supra note 290, at 97, 100; Jerome P. Kassirer, Academic Medical Centers
Under Siege, 331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1370, 1371 (1994).
293. Pardes, supra note 290, at 97.
294. Id. at 97.
295. Id. at 98 (citing Marc W. Kirschner et al., The Role of Biomedical Research in Health
Care Reform, 266 SCIENCE 49-51 (1994)).
296. Id. at 100.
297. Id. at 98 (quoting a Nov. 8, 1995 communication to President Clinton from the co-chair
of the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology).
298. Kenneth I. Shine, Some Imperatives for Clinical Research, 278 JAMA 245 (1997)
(citation omitted). See also Ernest Moy et al., Relationship Between National Institutes of Health
Research Awards to US Medical Schools and Managed Care Market Penetration, 278 JAMA 217
(1997).
299. David G. Nathan, Clinical Research: Perceptions, Reality and Proposed Solutions, 280
JAMA 1427 (1998).
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that publication by clinical researchers “decreased significantly in competitive
markets, while the rate of publication for other faculty remained
unchanged.”300 It is expected that this market competition will “encourage
faculty to increase patient care activities perhaps at the expense of their
research and teaching activities” and “reduce[] institutional commitment to
activities such as research and teaching . . . .”301
The second unique service supplied by academic medical centers is their
willingness to serve as the safety net for many medically indigent patients in
the United States.302 Recent studies confirm that “medically indigent patients
are concentrated in major teaching hospitals.”303 In fact, “[a]cademic medical
centers [AMCs] supply over 50% of the nation’s care for indigents.”304 “As
the ranks of uninsured Americans continue to swell and as America becomes
more culturally and racially diverse, an increasing number of patients at risk of
being underserved will turn to AMCs for care.”305
There are several possible reasons for the concentration of medically
indigent patients in academic medical centers: such centers tend to be located
in inner cities, where most of the medically indigent reside; medically indigent
patients tend to have complex medical conditions, such as human
immunodeficiency virus (“HIV”), which academic medical centers are better
able to treat; medically indigent persons tend to have a greater incidence of
trauma injuries which academic medical centers, with their trauma centers, are
better able to treat; most academic medical centers have long traditions of
indigent care and “may be more willing than other hospitals to accept
medically indigent patients.”306 Providing indigent care, however, comes at
300. Eric G. Campbell et al., Relationship Between Market Competition and the Activities and
Attitudes of Medical School Faculty, 278 JAMA 222, 225 (1997).
301. Id. at 222.
302. “Medically indigent” patients are “patients who lack health insurance or who are covered
by Medicaid programs.” ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL COLLEGES (AAMC), MEETING
THE NEEDS OF COMMUNITIES 2 (1998) [hereinafter AAMC, MEETING THE NEEDS]. In 1994,
medically indigent patients accounted for 24% of hospitalizations and 40% of outpatient visits in
the United States. Id.
303. Id. at 3.
304. Pardes, supra note 290, at 100.
305. Ernest Moy et al., Academic Medical Centers and the Care of Undeserved Populations,
71 ACAD. MED. 1370, 1376 (1996). “From 1989 to 1993, the proportion of hospitalized patients
at risk of being underserved increased from 49.8% to 60.9% . . . .” Id. at 1374. These figures are
for “integrated AMCs” which are institutions that are members of the Council of Teaching
Hospitals and Health Systems (“COTH”) with “common ownership with a medical school or in
which chiefs of clinical services also function as department chairs in the medical school.” Id. at
1371-72. “Integrated” AMCs are most likely to be the 125 teaching hospitals selected for PATH
audits since OIG chose to conduct the audits on the “major teaching hospital or faculty practice
plan associated with each of the nation’s 125 medical schools.” GAO, CONCERNS WITH PATH,
supra note 2, at 12.
306. AAMC, MEETING THE NEEDS, supra note 302, at 4.
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high cost for academic medical centers. For example, in 1994 (the date of the
most recent data available) “[u]ncompensated care charges incurred by . . .
AMCs averaged over $14 million per AMC for bad debt and $21 million per
AMC for charity care.”307
A third unique service provided by academic medical centers is their
treatment of especially complex diseases. Academic medical centers treat
more complex medical conditions than do nonteaching hospitals. Consider the
following examples:


“96% of all bone marrow, liver, lung, and kidney transplants were
performed at major teaching hospitals” (12% of all admissions at
these hospitals);308



“Major teaching hospitals are four times more likely than community
hospitals to offer reproductive health services and three times more
likely to provide crisis prevention services.”309



“Major teaching hospitals are dominant in three areas of technologyintensive services: accidents and other emergencies (e.g., burns, . . .
level 1 emergency, and neonatal and pediatric ICU); new services
with limited applications (e.g., PET scans); and care requiring
extensive resources from multiple services (e.g., transplants).”310



The medically indigent, who concentrate in major teaching hospitals,
have a higher prevalence of HIV disease.311

Treating the sickest patients and the most complex diseases means that
academic medical centers “do not fit naturally within managed care
systems . . . [which] anticipate that the majority of health services will be for
routine patient care in a relatively healthy population.”312 This “mis-fit” is
especially serious given the dominance of managed care reimbursement in the
American health care system. Academic medical centers’ incompatibility with
prevailing managed care reimbursement systems further destabilizes these
institutions, especially vis-a-vis nonteaching hospitals that enhance their
profitability under managed care reimbursement by shifting even more
indigent health care to teaching hospitals. Because of their multiple missions,
academic medical centers are “non-competitive in a price-sensitive

307.
308.
M.D.).
309.
310.
311.
312.

Moy et al., supra note 305, at 1372.
AAMC, MEETING THE NEEDS, supra note 302, at x (introduction by Paul F. Griner,
Id.
Id. at 33.
Id. at 4.
Carey & Engelhard, supra note 1, at 840.
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environment.”313 One recent study calculated that the “average cost of care per
admission was about $6000 in teaching hospitals . . . , as compared with about
$4400 in nonteaching hospitals.”314 Not surprising, “health plans avoid
contracting with teaching hospitals . . . because of their higher costs”315 and
consequently “many academic institutions are overbedded, underused, and in
turmoil.”316
The last unique service performed by academic medical centers is
education, not only of American medical students, residents and fellows, but
also of selected physicians and scientists from around the world. Although the
Medicare program pays teaching hospitals for training these individuals, the
amount paid does not adequately cover the cost of medical education:
“graduate training is financed largely by revenues from patient care in teaching
hospitals.”317
In short, diverting the resources, time, and human capital of an academic
medical center to respond to a health care fraud investigation disrupts the
already fragile balance at teaching hospitals as they attempt to continue their
unique mission. Subjecting these vulnerable institutions to the disruptions of a
fraud investigation is a serious matter.
There is much to learn from the PATH initiative about how to investigate
suspected health care fraud. There are important advantages to employing a
national initiative strategy, both for the government and for the targets of the
investigation. When the suspected fraud is on a large scale, consolidation
through a national initiative allows for a similarly large scale response, instead
of a scattered and piecemeal approach. Consolidation promotes an efficient
use of resources; almost certainly ensures that every prosecuting office and
every target has the benefit of experienced prosecutors and defense counsel
from offices nationwide; provides greater opportunity to systematically change
the source of any fraud; and enhances the potential for meaningful dialog
among the parties on almost every issue. However, as PATH has shown, the
disadvantage of a national initiative is that if it is poorly focused, its
destructive impact is compounded.
Ironically, one of the most innovative law enforcement tactics employed in
sophisticated investigations, especially in health care fraud investigations, may
be a culprit when national initiatives go awry. Parallel proceedings, through
which the government employs a combination of criminal, civil and
administrative sanctions to address improper conduct committed by a

313. John K. Inglehart, Rapid Changes for Academic Medical Centers: First of Two Parts,
331 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1391, 1392 (1994).
314. Id.
315. Id. at 1394.
316. Kassirer, supra note 292, at 1370.
317. Inglehart, supra note 313, at 1392.
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defendant, have been available for years.318 The past decade has seen a more
aggressive use of parallel proceedings, however, especially in health care.319
There are reasons for this. Intent to defraud can be difficult to prove in health
care cases given the ambiguity of billing regulations and the diffusion of actual
billing responsibility among personnel in many health care providers’
offices.320 Investigations that preserve the prosecutors’ option of proceeding
administratively or civilly on determinations that the billing errors were
unintentional, or proceeding criminally when evidence of intent is present,
provide needed flexibility to deal with providers who have billed insurers
improperly. In addition, the complexity of billing regulations have required
that criminal investigators team up with billing experts and auditors during the
investigation. This inter-team communication enhances the prospects for
varied and multiple levels of prosecution. Recognizing these facts, Congress
has made available investigative tools, such as Inspector General subpoenas321
and Civil Investigative Demands,322 that enhance the ability of law
enforcement officials to share information obtained during an investigation
with civil and administrative members of the investigation team. Attorney
General Janet Reno’s 1997 directive to United States Attorneys to make
greater use of parallel proceedings recognizes these advantages:
In order to maximize the efficient use of resources, it is essential that our
attorneys consider whether there are investigative steps common to civil and
criminal prosecutions, and to agency administrative actions. . . . Accordingly,
every United States Attorney’s office and each Department Litigation Division
should have a system for coordinating the criminal, civil and administrative
aspects of all white-collar crime matters within the office.323

318. Note, Using Equitable Powers to Coordinate Parallel Civil and Criminal Actions, 98
HARV. L. REV. 1023, 1023 n.5 (1984).
319. Anthony A. Joseph & R. Marcus Givhan, The New Litigative Environment: Defending a
Client in Parallel Civil and Criminal Proceedings, 60 ALA. LAW. 48, 48 (1999); BUCY, HEALTH
CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, § 5.01; DOJ FRAUD REPORT FY 1997, supra note 95, EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 2 F. Supp.2d 592 (D. N.J. 1998) (defendant
convicted on criminal charges, found liable under the Civil False Claims Act and excluded from
Medicare); Seide v. Shalala, 31 F. Supp.2d 466 (E.D. Pa. 1998) (Health care provider was
“prohibited from engaging in any occupation that involved Medicare or Medicaid claims for
reimbursement for three years” after being convicted of Medicare fraud.).
320. BUCY, HEALTH CARE FRAUD, supra note 3, § 1.04[3].
321. Id. § 6.04.
322. Id. § 6.05. Before these tools were available, most fraud investigations were conducted
through grand jury investigations which do not permit such sharing of information. Id. § 6.03;
SARA SUN BEALE & WILLIAM BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.01 (1986 & Supp.
1998); FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2) (1999).
323. Memorandum from Attorney General Janet Reno to Federal Attorneys, July 28, 1997;
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 979 (1999).
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Despite the flexibility they afford, parallel proceedings can alter an
investigation’s dynamics. When the investigation of health care fraud is
conducted so as to preserve the potential for multiple levels of liability,
especially criminal liability, communication between investigators and targets
during an investigation is stifled. As long as criminal charges or exclusion is a
possible outcome of an investigation, investigators must be concerned about
records being “lost” or destroyed, witnesses being tampered with, and files
fabricated. With these concerns, the government cannot caucus with the
targets of its investigation as it formulates its investigation strategy. This lost
opportunity for candid dialog between regulator and regulated is unfortunate.
Prior to the common use of parallel proceedings, when most billing
irregularities were resolved by audit, the stakes were not as high, the concerns
about the integrity of evidence were not as wide-spread and thus, early dialog
between investigators and providers was more feasible.
Early dialog may well have helped focus PATH. In July, 1997, one year
after the PATH initiative began, the General Counsel of HHS responded to
substantial information supplied by the academic medical centers regarding
PATH.324 The HHS Counsel agreed that “the standards for paying teaching
physicians under Part B of Medicare have not been consistently and clearly
articulated by HCFA over a period of decades.”325 The OIG then curtailed the
scope of future PATH audits.326 Such dialog undoubtedly would have been
beneficial earlier in the formulation of the PATH initiative.
Because many white collar investigations have the potential of disrupting
society, the prosecutive decision to proceed with an investigation entailing
potential criminal, civil or administrative liability should be undertaken with
care. A formal assessment of the economic and societal impact of the
prospective investigation should be part of the decision-making process.
Currently, prosecutors are not hired, nor trained, to evaluate the economic,
social and market impact of a large-scale fraud investigation. That should
change. A plethora of governmental working groups exists to coordinate
health care fraud investigations and government direction. These or similar
groups should be utilized to help provide prosecutors with necessary
information on industry.327

324. See generally Rabb Letter, supra note 10.
325. Id. at 3.
326. Id.
327. Beginning in 1993, the Executive Level Health Care Fraud Policy Group has met
monthly. Its members include the HHS Inspector General, representatives from DOJ’s Criminal
and Civil Divisions, the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee Health Care Fraud
Subcommittee, the FBI and HCFA. DOJ FRAUD REPORT FY 1997, supra note 95, at 6-7. The
National Health Care Fraud Working Group meets quarterly. Its 100 members include federal
and state prosecutors and investigators. Id. Additionally, a health care fraud task force currently
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IV. CONCLUSION
There is a large, aggressive law enforcement machine poised to pursue
health care fraud. It is supplied with ample resources and powerful statutory
weapons, including criminal statutes carrying twenty year terms of
imprisonment and mandatory forfeiture; the FCA with its huge, statutorily-set
monetary awards; and administrative sanctions that can demolish a health care
provider.
The weapons available to combat health care fraud are appropriately
powerful. The health care provider who has intentionally and systematically
set out to defraud health care insurers and patients is a predator and should be
pursued relentlessly, with the full force of all sanctions available. Because of
the size and complexity of the American health care system, insurers who pay
health care bills are especially vulnerable to fraud. Honesty and a good faith
effort to comply with applicable billing regulations are essential for the
American health care system to stay afloat. Moreover, fraudulent health care
providers do more than cheat insurers of money. Their actions may harm
patients, who by definition, are ill and dependent on others for the most basic
of care. The health care providers who breach these fiduciary relationships
deserve the condemnation of society as conveyed by our most severe
sanctions, should be flushed out of the health care system, and should be held
forth as examples for maximum deterrent effect. Because of their ability to
efficiently address nationwide fraud practices, national initiatives are
invaluable auditing and investigative strategies in detecting and deterring such
health care providers.
However, as the PATH initiative has demonstrated, care should be taken in
deploying the formidable weapons available to combat health care fraud.
There is a danger that the health care fraud law enforcement machine that
exists will take on a life of its own, where the focus becomes numbers: of
investigations undertaken, convictions, fines, damages, penalties, and
exclusions, rather than achieving the best health care for Americans at a fair
cost. The PATH initiative is illustrative for two reasons. First, it exemplifies
the difficulty of detecting fraud in a highly regulated area governed by multiple
regulations. Second, it demonstrates the hardship created for targets of fraud
investigations.

exists. Its members include representatives from FBI, state and local law enforcement, Inspectors
General and private industry. HHS & DOJ FRAUD REPORT FY 1998, supra note 92, at 21.
On June 3, 1998, the Deputy Attorney General, Eric H. Holder, Jr., sent guidance to all
relevant attorneys within the Department of Justice regarding national initiatives. See
Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Guidance on the Use of the
False Claims Act in Civil Health Care Matters (June 3, 1998). This guidance is helpful and
should further the appropriate exercise of prosecutorial discretion.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

50

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:3

No one could dispute that hardship or not, fraudulent institutions should be
aggressively investigated and relentlessly prosecuted. However, the internal
and social costs of such investigations are high, and care should be taken so
that the mystique of the health care fraud law enforcement machine does not
seduce the regulator into becoming a hunter when there is no prey. Pursuit of
fraudulent health care providers is only one aspect of a functional health care
system; understanding when a systemic regulatory breakdown has occurred is
also vital. The current emphasis on prosecuting fraudulent health care
providers threatens to sweep aside this less glamorous analysis. The
Departments of Justice and Health and Human Services and Congress should
be just as vigilant in creating incentives for the proper exercise of prosecutorial
discretion as they have been in building a well-oiled machine to combat health
care fraud.

